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INTRODUCTION

The Montana Supreme Court long ago adopted the general
rule that, absent a contrary contractual agreement or statutory
provision, the prevailing party in a civil action is not entitled to
recover attorney fees.' Although the court periodically has created
narrow exceptions to the pay-your-own-way doctrine,2 the general
1.
2.

Bovee v. Helland, 52 Mont. 151, 155, 156 P. 416, 417 (1916).
See Comment, Attorney Fees: Slipping From the American Rule Straight Jacket,
40 MONT. L. REV. 308 (1979), for an indepth discussion of various judicially-created exceptions to the general rule.
The most notable judicially-created exception to the general rule in Montana is that a
court, on a case-by-case basis, may exercise its equity power to grant complete relief to the
prevailing party, including an award of attorney fees. Foy v. Anderson, 176 Mont. 507, 511,
580 P.2d 114, 116 (1978). The supreme court has approved the application of the Foy doctrine only in the following limited situations: (1) where a party, through no fault of its own,
is forced to defend a frivolous action, Holmstrom Land Co. v. Hunter, 182 Mont. 43, 48-49,
595 P.2d 360, 363 (1979); Stickney v. State, __
Mont.
.,636 P.2d 860, 862 (1981); (2)
where one finds "it necessary to intervene in a frivolous action, although not technically
forced to become [a party]," State ex rel. Wilson v. Dep't of Nat. Resources and Conserv.,
__
Mont. __ ,648 P.2d 766, 770 (1982) (attorney fees ultimately were denied because the
action was not frivolous, id. at
-, 648 P.2d at 722); or (3) where the jury, in its special
verdict, grants attorney fees as a measure of consequential damages, Cate v. Hargrave, Mont. __
, 680 P.2d 952, 957 (1984).
Cate is an anomaly which could haunt the courts for many years. There was neither
statutory nor contractual basis for awarding attorney fees in Cate, a water rights action with
a counterclaim sounding in trespass and conversion. The district court instructed the jury
that any damage award should be specified in dollars and cents. The district court nevertheless approved the jury's determination that the sole measure of damages for the defendants,
who prevailed on their counterclaim, should be court costs and reasonable attorney fees, as
determined by the district court. The supreme court held that the defendants' injuries, suffered as a result of some coplaintiffs' "reprehensible form of self-help" (interfering with an
irrigation headgate) id., were compensable. Although the supreme court did not condone the
jury's method of calculating the defendants' damages, it refused to disturb the general
award of costs and attorney fees merely because it was technically flawed. Id.
Although Cate invoked the rarely-used theory that the prevailing party's consequential
damages include reasonable attorney fees, the supreme court appeared to follow the logic
implicit in Board of Trustees v. Eaton, 185 Mont. 453, 458, 605 P.2d 1083, 1086 (1979). In
Eaton, the supreme court reversed the district court's decision, held that the school board
had improperly dismissed Eaton, a high school principal, and awarded Eaton attorney fees,
even though no statutory or contractual authority existed for such an award of attorney
fees. Indeed, Eaton apparently never even prayed for the attorney fees that he ultimately
was awarded: in his appellate brief Eaton asked merely for "reinstatement . . . together
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rule usually is strictly enforced.'
This comment discusses and analyzes the numerous Montana
statutory provisions that permit a prevailing party in certain civil
actions to recover attorney fees. Because the degree of discretion
available to the district court in awarding attorney fees varies between statutes, this comment discusses those variations where appropriate. This comment also discusses case law as it relates to the
various attorney fee statutes. Space limitations preclude discussing
the recovery of attorney fees under a contractual agreement 4 and
recovery under the judicially-created exceptions to the general
rule.
The purpose of this comment is to provide an overview of the
prevailing party's right to recover attorney fees under Montana
statutes. This comment is divided into specific areas of law in order to provide an efficient reference source.
II.

PRELIMINARY NOTES

A court cannot award attorney fees until it can determine
which party is the prevailing party.' A party is the prevailing party
only if the court has rendered affirmative judgment in that party's
favor at the conclusion of the entire case.'
An award of attorney fees, like any other award, must be
based on competent evidence. 7 In determining what constitutes
reasonable attorney fees, the court should consider:
the amount and character of the services rendered, the labor,
time and trouble involved, the character and importance of the
litigation in which the services were rendered, the amount of
money or the value of property to be affected, the professional
with his back pay and benefits." Appellant's Brief at 19, Eaton. Notwithstanding a dissent
by Justice Shea, the Eaton court awarded attorney fees without ever addressing the issue of
the propriety of the award. Due to this absence of analysis, one can only speculate as to the
court's reasons for its award of attorney fees to Eaton.
Until the supreme court makes a definitive and unequivocal statement regarding the
Foy doctrine and its prodgeny, attorneys will continue to be confused regarding the prevailing party's ability to recover attorney fees without the aid of a statute or a contract
provision.
3. See, e.g., Thompkins v. Fuller,
- Mont. , 667 P.2d 944, 954 (1983). In
Thompkins the court stated that the Foy doctrine (see discussion supra, note 2) applies
only "where the prevailing party has been forced into an action that is frivolous and utterly
without merit." Id.
4. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-3-704 (1983), and the cases annotated thereunder, for
discussion of the issue of recovering attorney fees under a contractual provision.
5. Jordan v. Elizabethan Manor, 181 Mont. 424, 434, 593 P.2d 1049, 1055 (1979).
6. Id.
7. Crncevich v. Georgetown Recreation Corp., 168 Mont. 113, 120, 541 P.2d 56, 59
(1975).
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skill and experience called for, [and] the character and standing
in their profession of the attorneys.'
The court may also consider other factors, including the result secured through the attorney's services' and the contemporary market value of the attorney's services rendered. 10 Although the contract between the attorney and his client generally is the "measure
and mode" of determining attorney fees, 1 certain statutory and judicial rules have substituted other standards for determining the
amount to which the prevailing party is entitled as reasonable attorney fees. Where appropriate, this comment discusses those
rules.
Some of the statutes discussed in this comment allow for an
award of attorney fees to either party that prevails, while others
permit only a prevailing plaintiff to recover attorney fees. Although some statutes permitting only the prevailing plaintiff to recover attorney fees have been challenged successfully on equal protection grounds,' 2 recent case law suggests that the Montana
Supreme Court likely will not declare such "plaintiffs only" statutes to be violative of the equal protection doctrine.'"
8. Forrester v. Boston & Montana Consolidated Copper and Silver Mining Co., 29
Mont. 397, 409, 74 P. 1088, 1093 (1904) (quoting Enc. Law 420) (quoted with approval in
Crncevich at 119-20, 541 P.2d at 59, and First Security Bank of Bozeman v. Tholkes, 169
Mont. 422, 429-30, 547 P.2d 1328, 1332 (1976)).
9. Id.
10. Wight v. Hughes Livestock Co., Inc.,
- Mont. -, 664 P.2d 303, 312 (1983).
11. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-10-301 (1983).
12. See, e.g., Dewell v. Northern Pac. R.R. Co., 54 Mont. 350, 353, 170 P. 753, 754
(1918); Solberg v. Sunburst Oil & Gas Co., 73 Mont. 94, 109, 235 P. 761, 765 (1925) (discussed infra note 159).
13. See, e.g., McMillen v. Arthur G. McKee and Co., 166 Mont. 400, 408, 533 P.2d
1095, 1099 (1975), in which the Montana Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-611 (1983), which allows workers' compensation claimants to recover attorney fees from the insurer in certain situations, but does not permit the insurer to
recover attorney fees from the claimant in any situation. See infra, section XI, subsection E,
this comment, for further discussion of attorney fees in workers' compensation cases.
The McMillen court cited Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Cade, 233 U.S. 642
(1914), which upheld the validity of a Texas statute permitting plaintiffs to recover attorney
fees if they prevailed in a wage claim action, but denying prevailing defendants a reciprocal
right to recover attorney fees. In Cade, the Supreme Court stated as follows:
If the classification is otherwise reasonable, the mere fact that attorney's fees
are allowed to successful plaintiffs only, and not to successful defendants, does not
render the statute repugnant to the "equal protection" clause. This is not discrimination between different citizens or classes of citizens, since members of any and
every class may either sue or be sued . . ..
Even were the statute to be considered as imposing a penalty upon unsuccessful defendants in cases within its sweep, such penalty is obviously imposed as an
incentive to prompt settlement of small but well-founded claims, and as a deterrent of groundless defenses, which are the more impressive where the amount is
small . . ..
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The statutes that allow a prevailing party to recovery attorney
fees inconsistently classify recoverable attorney fees as "costs,"
"damages," or neither specifically. This inconsistency appears to
be of only minor significance, for the district court judge, and not
the jury, generally has sole authority to set reasonable attorney
fees, regardless of the technical classification of such fees.14
While reading this comment, one should be aware that even if
a party is awarded attorney fees by the court, the time spent by its
attorney in securing the court-ordered payment of attorney fees is
not to be considered in computing the award. 16 The supreme court
has rejected "the notion that the court may require one party to
pay opposing counsel for his time spent in seeking justification of
the fee he desires."'"
III.

NoN-UCC COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW

The consumer movement of the late 1960's and 1970's brought
about many legislative acts designed to protect individuals, and
sometimes small businesses, from overbearing practices of businesses whose trade does not depend on the satisfaction of a handful of 'customers. Because most consumer purchases are relatively
inexpensive, the cost of litigation in consumer law usually would
surpass the amount of the recovery if no steps were taken to mitigate or redistribute the litigation expenses. Hence, many of the
consumer protection acts include provisions that allow the prevailing party to recover attorney fees, thereby encouraging persons
with strong cases to pursue their claims in court.
A.

Unfair Trade Practices, Deceptive Practices, and Deceptive
Business Practices
The Legislature provided a broad avenue for the recovery of

The outlay for an attorney's fee is a necessary consequence of the litigation,
and since it must fall upon one party or the other, it is reasonable to impose it
upon the party whose refusal to pay a just claim renders the litigation necessary.
The allowance of ordinary costs of suit to the prevailing party rests upon the same
principle.
Cade, 233 U.S. at 650-52. The Montana Supreme Court also held that the "plaintiffs only"
provision for attorney fees in MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-611 did not violate the equal protection clause of the Montana Constitution, MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4. McMillen, 166 Mont. at
408, 533 P.2d at 1099. See also In re Montana Pacific Oil and Gas Co.,__ Mont. -, 614
P.2d 1045, 1047 (1980) (discussed infra note 163, this comment).
14. See, e.g., Kadillak v. Dep't of State Lands, 198 Mont. 70, 74, 643 P.2d 1178, 1181
(1983); Vaill v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 66 Mont. 301, 305, 213 P. 446, 448 (1923) (overruled
on other grounds in Winer v. Jonal Corp., 169 Mont. 247, 253, 545 P.2d 1094, 1097 (1976)).
15. In re Marriage of Bliss, 187 Mont. 331, 336, 609 P.2d 1209, 1212-13 (1980).
16. Id.
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attorney fees when it adopted the Montana Unfair Trade Practices
and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (the Act). 7 Section 30-14133 of the Montana Code Annotated permits a court to award reasonable attorney fees to a single purchaser of consumer goods who
proves that he has suffered a loss as a result of the seller's use or
employment of "[u]nfair methods of competition [or] deceptive
acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce. ' ,,
The potential broad avenue for recovery of attorney fees lies
in the Legislature's failure to define specifically the terms "unfair
methods of competition" and "deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce." The term "unfair methods of
competition," although not defined specifically by statute, apparently includes the following: price fixing, illegal production restrictions, bid rigging, bid kickbacks, and illegal monopolies; ' 9 price
discrimination by a distributor for the purpose of injuring a dealer
of a commodity;2 0 unfair purchasing competition;2 ' sales at less
than cost for the purpose of injuring competitors;" pooling or competition fixing by neighboring grain warehouses;2 3 destroying food
that is fit for sale and consumption;2 4 altering invoices for the purpose of injuring a competitor;2 5 bidding, inviting to bid, or otherwise negotiating for or entering into an agreement for a license to
show a motion picture without first showing the motion picture to
any motion picture theater operators in the market area who wish
to pre-screen the motion picture;2 6 and selling imitation Indian
crafts or articles. 7
The term "deceptive practices," defined in the criminal code, 28
includes, generally, obtaining property under false pretenses, conducting confidence games, selling property without consent of the
owner, and using credit cards fraudulently or without authorization. The Legislature adopted the deceptive practices statutes to
proscribe misleading activities which otherwise might not fall
under section 45-3-301 of the Montana Code Annotated, the crimi17.

MONT. CODE ANN. Title 30, ch. 14, part 1 (1983).

18.

MONT. CODE ANN.

§ 30-14-133 (1983) makes internal reference to
quoted here.
(1983).
(1983).
(1983).
(1983).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-216 (1983).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-217 (1983).

MONT. CODE ANN.

§ 30-14-103 (1983), which is the statute
19. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-205
20. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-207
21. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-208
22. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-219
23.
24.
25.

MONT. CODE ANN.

§

26.
27.

MONT. CODE ANN.
MONT. CODE ANN.

§§
§§

28.

MONT. CODE ANN.

§§ 45-6-317, -318 (1983).

30-14-218 (1983).

30-14-301 through -308 (1983).
30-14-601 through -604 (1983).
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nal theft statute.2 9 Section 30-14-103 of Montana Code Annotated
does not state whether the criminal code definition of deceptive
practices is exclusive, partial, or even applicable to the Act. Deceptive practices, for purposes of recovering attorney fees under Section 30-14-133 of Montana Code Annotated, conceivably could include such criminal acts as chain distributor schemes, 30 forgery,31
and issuing bad checks."2 The statutory law is unclear whether
these provisions come under the umbrella of deceptive practices,
and the supreme court has not been faced with the issue.
A successful party in a civil action arising out of a deceptive
business practice may also recover attorney fees, at the discretion
of the court.3 3 Deceptive business practices, also defined in the
criminal code, include falsifying weights and measures, shorting
the quantity on a sale, taking without authority an extra quantity
on a purchase, adulterating or mislabeling commodities, and false
advertising. 4
A consumer who purchases consumer goods as a result of doorto-door, telephone, or other seller-initiated solicitation, at a place
other than the seller's place of business, is entitled to cancel such
purchase, return the goods in substantially the same condition as
they were received, and receive a full refund, provided the consumer makes such cancellation within three business days of the
original sale. 35 If the seller refuses within ten days of the consumer's timely cancellation to refund the amount the consumer
paid for the goods, the consumer may bring an action for the
amount paid, $100 in damages, and costs; and if the consumer
prevails in the action, the court shall award him reasonable attorney fees." If the consumer fails to prevail in such an action, the
seller apparently is not afforded the reciprocal right to recover attorney fees.
B.

Debt Collection and Credit Reporting

Retail installment sales contracts 37 typically include a provi29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

34.

MONT.
MONT.
MONT.
MONT.
MONT.
MONT.

CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE

ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.

ANN.
ANN.

§ 45-6-317 annot. (1984).

§
§

45-6-319 (1983).
45-6-325 (1983).
§ 45-6-316 (1983).
§ 30-14-133 (1983).
§ 45-6-318 (1983).
§ 30-14-504 (1983).
§ 30-14-506 (1983).
sales contracts are defined by MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-1-202(1)(n)

35. MONT. CODE ANN.
36. MONT. CODE ANN.
37. Retail installment
(1983) as follows:
"Retail installment contract" or "contract" means an agreement evidencing a
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sion that, should the buyer become delinquent in his payments
and the seller find it necessary to turn the account over to an attorney for collection, the seller is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees. Section 31-1-235 of the Montana Code Annotated statutorily limits attorney fees in such collection actions to 15% of the
amount due and payable under the contract. In addition, the statute permits the creditor to recover court costs and "reasonable
out-of-pocket expenses incurred in connection with such delinquency."3 Although this statute was enacted in 1959, no cases
have arisen under it, and "reasonable out-of-pocket expenses" remains officially undefined.
A consumer credit reporting agency, or any user of its information, which willfully violates the consumer credit reporting
laws 9 with respect to any particular consumer is liable to that consumer for his actual damages, punitive damages, costs, and reasonable attorney fees.4 ° The awarding of attorney fees appears to be
mandatory if the consumer prevails in such action. A prevailing
credit reporting agency, however, apparently is not given a reciprocal statutory right to attorney fees.
C. Sales of Fraudulent,Misrepresented, or Unregistered
Securities, and Fraudulent Sales of Out-of-State Subdivision
Tracts to Montanans
A person who buys an unregistered security 1 which is not exempted from registration,4 2 or a person who purchases a security as
the result of fraud or misrepresentation by the seller, may sue the
seller to recover the consideration paid for the security, plus annual interest of 10% of the price paid, plus costs and reasonable
attorney fees, less the income the buyer received from the securretail installment transaction entered into in this state under which a buyer
promises to pay in one or more deferred installments the time sale price of goods
or services, or both. The term includes a chattel mortgage, conditional sales contract, and a contract for the bailment or leasing of goods by which the bailee or
lessee contracts to pay as compensation for its use a sum substantially equivalent
to or in excess of its value and by which it is agreed that the bailee or lessee is
bound to become, or for no further or a merely nominal consideration has the
option of becoming, the owner of the goods upon full compliance with the provisions of the contract.
38. MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-1-235 (1983).
39. Found in MONT. CODE ANN. Title 31, ch. 3, part 1 (1983).
40. MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-3-142 (1983).
41. "Security" is defined at MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-103(11) (1983).
42. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-10-202 through -205 (1983) provides for exemptions from
registration.
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ity.'3 It is not clear whether the statute allowing for attorney fees
in securities cases is mandatory or discretionary.
Major real estate developers who intend to sell undeveloped
subdivision tracts located outside of Montana to persons in Montana are required by the Foreign Land Sales Practices Act 44 to register with the Montana Board of Realty Regulation and to deliver
a public offering statement to the purchaser for his review.' 5 If the
seller fails to register with the Board, fails to deliver the public
offering statement to the purchaser, or omits a material fact or
makes an untrue statement of material fact in disposing of the
subdivided land, the purchaser may bring an action against the
seller. Unless the seller proves either that the purchaser knew of
the untruth or admission, that the seller reasonably could not have
known of the untruth or omission, or that the purchaser did not
rely on the untruth or omission in making his purchase, the purchaser is entitled to recover the amount paid for the property, plus
interest of 6% per annum from the date of payment, property
taxes paid, costs, and reasonable attorney fees, less income the
6
purchaser derived from the subdivision tract.'
D.

Common Carriersand Railroads

Each common carrier that carries property for hire within
Montana is liable to its customers for loss, damage, or injury to
property incurred during the shipping of goods with the particular
common carrier.4 7 If the customer files a claim of loss, damage, or
injury with the carrier, the carrier must either pay or deny the
claim within 120 days of its receipt, or else face legal action. If the
customer brings an action for the amount of the claim, and if the
customer has inquired as to the delay with the carrier in writing
within the 120 day period, then the trial court has discretionary
authority to award reasonable attorney fees, not exceeding $500, to
the prevailing party.'8 If the lost, damaged, or injured property was
carried by more than one common carrier, the carrier against
whom the customer brought the claim is entitled to full indemnification, including damages and litigation expenses, from the carrier
43. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-307 (1983). See the text of the statute for specific restrictions, additions, qualifications, and contingencies.
44. MONT. CODE ANN. Title 76, ch. 4, part 12 (1983).
45. MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-4-1226 (1983).
46. MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-4-1247 (1983).
47. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 69-11-421 through -426 (1983).
48. MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-11-426 (1983).
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on whose line the loss, damage, or injury occurred.49
If a court or jury finds that a motor carrier 5" or a railroad 5
willfully charged rates or fares in excess of those established by the
Public Service Commission for the services performed, the customer is entitled to recover treble damages for the overcharged
amount, costs, litigation expenses, and reasonable attorney fees.
The award of attorney fees in such situations appears to be
mandatory, although a motor carrier or railroad which prevails
does not enjoy a reciprocal right to attorney fees.
If a livestock owner brings an action against a railroad company for negligently killing the owner's livestock, the prevailing
party is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees.52 If the livestock owner prevails in court, but the railroad company has submitted a written settlement offer to the livestock owner at least
forty days prior to the filing of the complaint, and if such settlement offer exceeded or equalled the amount recovered by the livestock owner in court, then the livestock owner is not entitled to
attorney fees. 3
E.

Protection of Private FranchiseHolders

If a Montana farm implement, industrial equipment, or automobile dealer enters into a written dealership contract evidenced
by a franchise agreement, sales agreement, or security agreement,
and if the franchisor or the dealer cancels the contract, the
franchisor must refund to the dealer 100% of the wholesale value
of all new inventory and 85% of the wholesale value for all repair
parts then in the dealer's inventory."4 If the franchisor fails or refuses to repurchase the dealer's inventory, the franchisor is liable
for 100% of the wholesale value of the dealer's inventory, plus
freight charges paid by the dealer, in addition to court costs and
the dealer's attorney fees. 55 The awarding of attorney fees to the
dealer is mandatory. If the franchisor prevails, however, it is not
entitled to recover attorney fees.
If a new automobile dealer suffers pecuniary loss due to the
franchisor's improper or unfair termination or cancellation of the
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

MONT. CODE ANN.
MONT. CODE ANN.
MONT. CODE ANN.

§ 69-11-427 (1983).
§ 69-12-511 (1983).
§ 69-14-322 (1983).

§ 69-14-709(1) (1983).
Id. at § 69-14-709(2).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-11-702 (1983). Exceptions to the stated rule are listed at
MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-11-703 (1983).
55. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-11-712 (1983).
MONT. CODE ANN.
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dealer's franchise 5 or the franchisor's coercion of the dealer to accept products not ordered by the dealer,57 the dealer may bring an
action to recover damages. If he prevails, the dealer is entitled to
treble damages plus costs, and attorney fees. 8 The right to receive
attorney fees apparently is not reciprocated to the prevailing
franchisor.
If an automobile franchisor wrongfully denies family members
of a deceased or incapacitated automobile dealer from succeeding
the dealer in the ownership or operation of the dealership, the
wrongfully denied family members may bring an action to recover
any pecuniary loss resulting from the wrongful denial.5 9 If the family members prevail in such an action, they are entitled to treble
damages, costs, and reasonable attorney fees. 60 The family's right
to recover attorney fees appears to be mandatory, and the right
apparently does not extend reciprocally to prevailing franchisors.
IV.

FORECLOSING LIENS AND OTHER SECURITY INTERESTS

Although the agreement which sets the foundation for a security interest often will include a clause granting attorney fees to the
prevailing party in any action brought under the agreement, the
Legislature has provided a statutory right to recover attorney fees
in certain situations involving foreclosures of secured interests in
property.
A.
1.

Uniform Commercial Code Foreclosures

Non-Judicial Foreclosures

After default by the debtor on a security interest governed by
the Uniform Commercial Code, and after non-judicial foreclosure
of the security interest, the secured party may dispose of the collateral in any commercially reasonable manner."1 The secured
party receives first priority to the proceeds from the disposition of
the collateral for the purpose of recovering reasonable costs of repossession and disposition of the collateral. The reasonable costs of
repossession and disposition include, to the extent provided in the
security agreement and not prohibited by law, the secured party's
56.

MONT. CODE ANN.

§ 61-4-205 (1983).

57.
58.

MONT.
MONT.
MONT.
MONT.
MONT.

§ 61-4-208 (1983).
§ 61-4-210 (1983).
§§ 61-4-131 through -137 (1983).
§ 61-4-137 (1983).
§ 30-9-504(1) (1983).

59.

60.
61.

CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE

ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
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reasonable legal expenses and attorney fees. 2 If the secured party
obtains a deficiency judgment against the debtor, the reasonable
costs of obtaining the deficiency judgment, including reasonable
attorney fees, generally are recoverable by the secured party under
the terms of the security agreement. 3 If, on the other hand, the
debtor successfully contests the non-judicial foreclosure, or if he
ultimately prevails in an action against the creditor for tortious
conversion of the repossessed collateral or for recovery of surplus
resulting from the creditor's disposition of the collateral, then the
creditor is reciprocally liable for the debtor's reasonable attorney
fees.6 4
The parties are free to define reasonable attorney fees in the
underlying security agreement.6 5 Unlike some states,6 6 Montana
has not statutorily limited the amount of attorney fees recoverable
in non-judicial foreclosures of security interests in personal property. Preprinted security agreement forms, however, typically set
the attorney fee in the event of such foreclosure at 15% of the
unpaid balance due under the security agreement.
2.

Judicial Foreclosures

Section 30-9-511 of the Montana Code Annotated provides
that in any judicial action to foreclose a security interest in personal property, the court must award reasonable attorney fees to
the prevailing party, "notwithstanding any stipulation in the instrument or any agreement between the parties to the contrary. "67
The right to recover attorney fees in a judicial foreclosure of a security interest in personal property is reciprocal; a party forced to
defend an unsuccessful judicial foreclosure action is entitled to reasonable attorney fees upon dismissal of the action. 8
Determination of reasonable attorney fees in a judicial personal property foreclosure action is left to the sound discretion of
the trial court.6 9 Even if the court receives expert testimony re62. Id.
63. Id. at § 30-9-504(2).
64. See MONT.CODE ANN. § 28-3-704 (1983), which makes reciprocal all contract provisions for the recovery of attorney fees.
65. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-9-504(1) (1983).
66. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21.2 (1983), which limits attorney fees in non-judicial
U.C.C. foreclosures to 15% of the unpaid balance.
67. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-9-511 (1983). Although this provision appears as part of the
Montana version of the Uniform Commercial Code, it is not part of the Uniform Act.
68. Graham v. Superior Mine, 100 Mont. 427, 432, 49 P.2d 443, 445 (1935). Graham
involved the foreclosure of a chattel mortgage, which was the forerunner of the modern-day
U.C.C. security interest.
69. Stewart v. Casey, 182 Mont. 185, 193, 595 P.2d 1176, 1181 (1979).
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garding the reasonableness of the fees sought, the court may ignore
such evidence in fixing the attorney fees. 0
Section 30-9-511 limits the recovery of attorney fees in personal property judicial foreclosure actions to the foreclosure proceeding itself, regardless of contrary provisions in the security
agreement. The statute does not allow recovery of attorney fees in
ancillary causes of action such as one for the tortious conversion of
the secured property by a third party,7 1 one brought on the underlying promissory note after the security interest in the personal
property has been exhausted through a prior foreclosure,7 2 or one
upon a guaranty where the guarantor promised to pay, among
other things, the secured party's attorney fees in the event of a
73
foreclosure of the security interest.
B.

Statutory Lien Foreclosures

Each party that establishes a salary and wage lien,74 a farm
laborers' lien, 75 a mechanics' lien,7 a loggers' lien,7 7 a thrashers'
lien,7 8 or an oil and gas wells or pipelines laborers' and materialmen's lien 9 is entitled to reasonable attorney fees incurred in an
action to foreclose on the lien, plus the costs of filing and recording
the lien." Reciprocally, the successful defendant is entitled to attorney fees incurred in defending against the lien.8 1 In either case,
the ultimately successful party is entitled to reasonable attorney
fees incurred in both district court and on appeal.82 The award of
70. Id.
71. Belgrade State Bank v. Swainson, 172 Mont. 350, 360, 564 P.2d 174, 180 (1977).
72. Goggins v. Bookout, 141 Mont. 449, 454, 378 P.2d 212, 214-15 (1963).
73. First Nat'l Park Bank v. Johnson, 553 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1977) (applying
Montana law).
74. MONT. CODE ANN. Title 71, ch. 3, part 3 (1983) provides for salary and wage liens.
The supreme court has held that, in actions arising out of part 3, attorney fees are recoverable only by an employee making a claim against an employer who has made an assignment
for the benefit of creditors. McBride v. School District No. 2, 88 Mont. 110, 117, 290 P. 252,
255 (1930). Although McBride appears correct with regard to §§ 71-3-301 through -307, employees with wage claims against solvent employers have statutory recourse to recover attorney fees under MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-3-214(1) (1983). See infra section X, subsection D, for
further discussion of an employee's right to recover attorney fees in a wage claim action.
75. MONT. CODE ANN. Title 71, ch. 3, part 4 (1983) provides for farm laborers' liens.
76. MONT. CODE ANN. Title 71, ch. 3, part 5 (1983) provides for mechanics' liens.
77. MONT. CODE ANN. Title 71, ch. 3, part 6 (1983) provides for loggers' liens.
78. MONT. CODE ANN. Title 71, ch. 3, part 8 (1983) provides for threshers' liens.
79. MONT. CODE ANN. Title 71, ch. 3, part 10 (1983) provides for laborers' and materialmen's liens.
80. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-3-124 (1983).
81. Id. See also Home Interiors, Inc. v. Hendrickson,
- Mont. -, 692 P.2d 1229,
1232 (1984).
82. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-3-124 (1983). Where the district court's ruling on attorney
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attorney fees to the prevailing party in actions arising out of any of
the above-enumerated liens is mandatory, not discretionary."
In Western Plumbing of Bozeman v. Garrison," the defendant homeowners, prior to trial, paid the amount of the mechanics'
liens, plus interest. The supreme court held that the lienholder had
filed the liens prematurely; 5 therefore, the lienholder had no right
to recover attorney fees in an action arising out of invalid liens.8 6
Rather, the court awarded attorney fees to the homeowners for
successfully defending against the liens.87
The amount of reasonable attorney fees awarded is determined within the discretion of the trial court.8 8 In Carkeek v.
Ayer,8 9 the property owner successfully defended against a foreclosure of a $6,200 mechanics' lien and was awarded $3,311.50 on a
counterclaim for defective workmanship. Partly due to the behavior of Carkeek's first attorney, Ayer's attorney fees amounted to
$5,773.20 for 144.33 hours of service. The trial court determined
that Ayer's attorney had performed the services stated and had
charged a reasonable fee, but it awarded only $3,000 in attorney
fees. The supreme court affirmed, reasoning in part that no statutory provision exists for recovering attorney fees on a counterclaim
such as Ayer's.90 The court stated that a
reasonable attorney fee in a given case does not necessarily result
from simple multiplication of the hours spent times a fixed hourly
rate. To award an attorneys fee [sic] of $5,773.20 in defending
against a $6,200 claim would appear most unreasonable regardless
of the time spent, the skill involved in the work, the experience of
the attorney and similar considerations. The defense is simply not
worth a fee approaching 100% of the amount of the lien. 1
fees comes too late to become part of the original or amended judgment, pursuant to Mont.
R. Civ. P. Rule 59, the prevailing party is entitled to recover attorney fees on cross-appeal.
Price Building Service, Inc. v. Holms, Mont. , 693 P.2d 553, 560 (1985).
83. Matzinger v. Remco, Inc., 171 Mont. 383, 389, 558 P.2d 650, 653 (1976).
84. 171 Mont. 85, 556 P.2d 520 (1976).
85. "In Montana the general rule is that the lien arises only upon completion of the
contracted work." Id. at 88, 556 P.2d at 522.
86. Id. at 88, 556 P.2d at 523. See also Monarch Lumber Co. v. Wallace, 132 Mont.
163, 314 P.2d 884 (1957).
87. 171 Mont. at 88, 556 P.2d at 523.
88. Carkeek v. Ayer,
- Mont. -, 613 P.2d 1013, 1015 (1980).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at , 613 P.2d at 1015-16. See also Simkins-Hallin Lumber Co. v. Simonson,
Mont. , 692 P.2d 424, 427 (1984), where the plaintiff succeeded in an action to
foreclose a mechanics' lien in the amount of $888.36. Although the plaintiff claimed
$2,648.75 as attorney fees, the district court awarded only $800 for attorney fees. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court had not abused its discretion.
The supreme court implied that district courts are justified in limiting attorney fees in
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Recently the supreme court held that contingency fee arrangements between the lienholder and its attorney may be considered
in determining reasonable attorney fees in mechanics' lien foreclosure actions.9 2 As in all mechanics' lien foreclosure actions, if the
contingency fee arrangement is found to be a reasonable means of
computing the prevailing party's attorney fees, the prevailing party
is entitled to court-determined reasonable attorney fees in addition
to any amount due on the lien. 3
C.

Real Property Mortgage Foreclosures

A court must award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing
party in an action to foreclose a mortgage on real property.9 4 The
statute is reciprocal, thereby allowing a defendant to recover attorney fees if successful.9 5 In determining reasonable attorney fees in
a real property mortgage foreclosure, the court may consider the
testimony of expert witnesses or its own knowledge,96 as well as the
amount of property involved and the complexity of the case.97
An intervenor in the foreclosure action may not recover attorney fees if the intervening action could be maintained independently of the foreclosure proceeding.98 A prevailing party cannot
recover attorney fees under the statute in an in personam action
on an underlying promissory note if the security in the real property was exhausted in a prior foreclosure action.9 9 To recover attorney fees if the security has been exhausted, the prevailing party
must rely on a contractual clause in the promissory note which
grants attorney fees to the prevailing party in any action brought
under the note.
Section 6323(b)(8) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that
an attorney's lien 1"0 on property takes priority over a federal tax
mechanics' lien foreclosure actions to an amount not exceeding the amount due on the lien
itself. Id.
92. Frank L. Pirtz Const., Inc. v. Hardin Town Pump, Inc., - Mont. , 692 P.2d
460, 464-65 (1984).
93. Id.
94. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-233 (1983).
95. Bermes v. Sylling, 179 Mont. 448, 464, 587 P.2d 377, 387 (1978).
96. Bohan v. Harris, 71 Mont. 495, 500, 230 P. 586, 588 (1924).
97. Bermes, 179 Mont. at 465, 587 P.2d at 387. The Bermes court overturned as "unreasonably low" a district court award of $7,500 as attorney fees in an equitable foreclosure
which involved approximately $200,000 worth of real property, a complex trial, and a complex appeal. The supreme court raised Bermes' award of attorney fees to $17,109, the
amount he sought.
98. Nikles v. Barnes, 153 Mont. 113, 119-20, 454 Pt2d 608, 611-12 (1969).
99. Goggins v. Bookout, 141 Mont. 449, 454, 378 P.2d 212, 214-15 (1963).
100. MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-61-420 (1983) provides for attorneys' liens.
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lien10 1 if the attorney's lien attaches prior to the federal tax lien.
The Federal District Court for Montana once ruled that attorney
fees were part of the mortgage debt and a necessary expense of
enforcing the mortgage lien, and that attorney fees incurred in a
mortgage foreclosure take priority over federal tax liens. 0 ' The
same court reversed itself three years later when, following an intervening United States Supreme Court case, 0 3 it ruled that the
attorney's lien took priority over the federal tax lien only if the
attorney's lien was certain in amount, due, and payable at the time
the federal tax lien attached.'" Because the attorney fees provided
for by statute in mortgage foreclosures are not due and payable
until the foreclosure sale, a federal tax lien which attaches prior to
the sale takes priority over the attorney's statutory right to his
05
fee.1
D.

Trust Indenture Foreclosures

Under the Montana Small Tract Financing Act'" the costs
and expenses of foreclosing on a trust indenture in real property,
including trustee fees and attorney fees, are given payment priority
out of the foreclosure proceeds.'0 7 Because of the similarities between trust indentures and real property mortgages, an attorney
fees lien in a trust indenture foreclosure likely would be
subordinate to any intervening federal tax liens.'08 Also, a prevailing party in an in personam action on the underlying promissory
note could probably not recover attorney fees if the security of the
trust indenture had been exhausted in a previous foreclosure
proceeding. 10 9
Section 71-1-320 of the Montana Code Annotated limits attorney fees in trust indenture foreclosure proceedings. If the property
is disposed of at a trustee's sale, the maximum allowable combined
trustee and attorney fees are 5% of the aggregate principal and
interest then due on the obligation. If the buyer reinstates his interest by making current his payments prior to the trustee's sale,
the attorney fees are limited to the lesser of $1,000 or 1% of the
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

INTERNAL REV. CODE § 6321 (CCH 1984) provides for federal tax liens.
Streeter Brothers v. Overfelt, 202 F. Supp. 143, 146 (D. Mont. 1962).
United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84 (1963).
First Nat'l Bank of Lewistown v. Tilzey, 238 F. Supp. 750, 751 (D. Mont. 1965).
Id. at 752.
MONT. CODE ANN. Title 71, ch. 1, part 3 (1983).

107.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-316(1) (1983).

108. See supra text accompanying note 104 for discussion of First Nat'l Bank of Lewistown v. Tilzey.
109. See Goggins v. Bookout, 141 Mont. at 454, 378 P.2d at 214-15.
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aggregate principal and interest which was due on the day of
default."'
E.

Defending Against Writs of Attachment

Section 27-18-204 of the Montana Code Annotated requires a
plaintiff seeking a prejudgment writ of attachment on property to
post a bond before the writ is issued. "If the defendant recovers
judgment or if the court finally decides that the plaintiff was not
entitled to an attachment," the plaintiff must use the posted bond
to pay the costs and damages, 1 including reasonable attorney
fees, 112 incurred by the defendant in successfully defending against
the attachment. The statute does not afford the plaintiff a reciprocal right to attorney fees if it prevails.
V.

NON-SECURED REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS

A.

Actions to PartitionReal Property

Because an action to partition real property is brought for the
benefit of all the joint tenants or tenants in common, 1 the costs of
the partition action, including reasonable attorney fees, are to be
paid by the persons receiving property under the partition judgment on a basis prorated to the respective interests in the original
estate. 4" This distribution of liability for attorney fees places the
parties upon relatively equal footing as to the necessary expenses
in effecting the partition of jointly- or commonly-held property for
the good of all the parties." 5 If litigation arises between only some
of the joint or cotenants, the district court in its discretion can
distribute the payment of attorney fees on other than a pro rata
basis, such as ordering the parties to pay their own attorney fees or
ordering one party to pay all the attorney fees. 6 If the plaintiff
brings a partition action, but the final judgment involves issues
only ancillary to the partition action, the plaintiff may not recover
attorney fees under the partition statute. 7
110. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-320 (1983).
111. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-18-204 (1983).
112. Plymouth Gold Mining Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 35 Mont.
23, 29, 88 P. 565, 567 (1907).
113. Murray v. Conlon, 19 Mont. 389, 391, 48 P. 743, 744 (1897); see also MONT. CODE
ANN. § 70-29-101 (1983).
114. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-29-218 (1983).
115. Murray, 19 Mont. at 392, 48 P. at 744.
116. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-29-218 (1983).
117. Kravik v. Lewis, Mont. -,
691 P.2d 1373, 1377 (1984).
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B.

Landlord-Tenant Actions

The prevailing party in actions brought under a residential
property rental agreement or under the Montana Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act of 1977118 may be awarded attorney fees
by the trial court, notwithstanding an agreement between the parties to the contrary." 9 If the landlord wrongfully withholds the
tenant's security deposit, the tenant may recover attorney fees in
addition to double damages. 2 ° In all landlord-tenant disputes, the
court's award of attorney fees is discretionary, not mandatory.
VI.

EMINENT DOMAIN, INVERSE CONDEMNATION, AND SECONDARY
EASEMENTS

A.

Eminent Domain

In any eminent domain121 action the government 2' 2 must first
prove that the public interest requires the taking of private property for public use.128 If the government fails to prove that the condemnation is necessary for the public interest, or if the eminent
domain proceeding is dismissed or abandoned, and if federal assistance was available for the proposed project out of which the eminent domain action arose, the entity which sought the condemnation order must pay the property owner's attorney, appraisal, and
engineering fees. 2 4
The adoption of the 1972 Montana Constitution effected a significant change in Montana's eminent domain laws. The new constitution provides that a property owner who prevails in court and
is awarded compensation greater than the government's final pretrial compensation offer is entitled to recover the "necessary expenses of litigation."1 5 In addition to codifying the constitutional
provision,126 the Legislature has defined the necessary expenses of
litigation to include the "reasonable and necessary attorney fees,
118. The Montana Residential Landlord and Tenant Act of 1977 is found at MONT.
Title 70, ch. 24 (1983).
119. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-24-442 (1983).
120. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-25-204 (1983).
121. "Eminent domain is the right of the state to take private property for public
use." MONT. CODE ANN. § 60-30-101 (1983).
122. As used in this discussion of eminent domain and inverse condemnation, the term
"government" refers to any entity, whether public or private, which enjoys the power of
eminent domain, as described in MONT.CODE ANN. § 70-30-102 (1983).
123. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-30-111 (1983).
124. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-30-304 (1983).
125. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 29.
126. Codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-30-305(2) (1983).
CODE ANN.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1985

19

Montana
Law Review,LAW
Vol. 46 REVIEW
[1985], Iss. 1, Art. 7
MONTANA

[Vol. 46

'
expert witness fees, exhibit costs, and court costs."127
The Montana Supreme Court has interpreted the legislative definition of
"necessary expenses of litigation" to include the expense of an appraiser who was employed by the condemnee but never called at
trial, 128 the cost of counsel's time spent with consultants examining
scientific information,'2 9 and the costs for other experts consulted
but never called at trial. 13 0
Following State Department of Highways v. Rogers,' in
which the supreme court ordered the government to pay the prevailing condemnee's significant contingent attorney fees, the Legislature defined reasonable attorney fees for eminent domain proceedings as "the customary hourly rates for an attorney's services
in the county in which the trial is held.' 32 Such fees are not computed with regard to any previously-established contingency fee
3
arrangement. 1
Although the government's offer of compensation conceivably
could include an amount for the condemnee's attorney fees,' 3 ' the
Montana Supreme Court has ruled that the statutory right to recover the necessary expenses of litigation does not vest upon the
filing of the condemnation action. 3 5 Rather, the right to recover
necessary costs of litigation accrues only after the condemnee has
obtained a court award in excess of the government's final pre-trial
3 6

offer.1

B.

Inverse Condemnation

In 1971 the Legislature gave property owners who prevail in
inverse condemnation' 3 7 proceedings the right to recover attorney
127. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-30-306(1) (1983).
128. State Dep't of Highways v. Rogers, 184 Mont. 181, 185, 602 P.2d 560, 562 (1979).
129. Blasdel v. Montana Power Co., 196 Mont. 417, 434, 640 P.2d 889, 899 (1982).
130. Id.
131. 184 Mont. 181, 602 P.2d 560 (1979).
132. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-30-306(2) (1983) (emphasis added).
133. Id.
134. See State Dep't of Highways v. Helehan, 186 Mont. 286, 289, 607 P.2d 537, 538
(1980). The Helehan court held that a condemnee's paying attorney fees, all of which were
incurred without going to trial, was not a "necessary expense of litigation," and therefore
should be borne by the condemnee. The court apparently left the door open for the government voluntarily paying the condemnee's pre-trial legal expenses as part of a settlement
offer.
135. State Dep't of Highways v. Donnes, 187 Mont. 338, 342-43, 609 P.2d 1213, 1216
(1980).
136. Id. See also State Dep't of Highways v. Burlingame, 185 Mont. 183, 186, 605 P.2d
176, 177 (1980); Helehan, 186 Mont. at 289, 607 P.2d at 538.
137. "Inverse condemnation" is an action or eminent domain proceeding brought by
the property owner rather than by the condemnor, and is available where private property
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fees and other necessary costs incurred in bringing the action. 1 8
The right to recover attorney fees in inverse condemnation proceedings is limited to those projects which received federal assistance.13 9 Unlike eminent domain actions, the right to attorney fees
under the inverse condemnation statute appears to vest in the
property owner immediately upon the recovery of any judgment
from the government. A unique characteristic of this statute is that
the "reasonable attorney fees" may be determined by either the
court rendering the judgment or by the attorney for the agency
which effects a settlement of the inverse condemnation action. 140
VII.

A.

WATER RIGHTS

Appeal of Department Ruling

If a person appeals to the district court a final decision of the
Department of Natural Resources and Conservation regarding an
application for a water rights appropriation permit, the district
court must award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party
on appeal."" Before the right to attorney fees vests, however, the
department first must hold a hearing and make a decision on the
permit application, and then the party seeking attorney fees must
prevail on the appeal to district court." 2
B.

Secondary Easements

A party with a canal or ditch easement also possesses a secondary easement to enter, inspect, repair, and maintain the canal
or ditch.' 4 3 In an action to enforce the rights under such a secondhas been taken for public use without formal condemnation proceedings and where it appears that the condemnor has no intention or willingness to bring a formal condemnation
proceeding. See, e.g., Wittke v. Kusel, 215 Kan. 403, 405, 524 P.2d 774, 776 (1974); Martin v.
Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 310 n.1, 391 P.2d 540, 542 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
989 (1965). Typically an inverse condemnation involves secondary effects from a government project, such as increased noise due to street or airport expansion, or offensive odors
from an upwind sewer treatment plant.
138. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-31-303 (1983).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-125 (1983).
142. State ex rel. Wilson v. Department of Natural Resources and Conservation, Mont. -. , 648 P.2d 766, 768-69 (1982).
143. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-112(1) (1983). If the canal or ditch easement was established prior to April 14, 1981, and no secondary easement was acquired prior to April 14,
1981, through conveyance or prescription, no secondary easement exists. Id. at § 70-17112(4).
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ary easement, the prevailing party is entitled to attorney fees.""4
VIII.

MINERAL RIGHTS AND MINERAL EXTRACTION

A.

Rights-of- Way

An owner of a mining claim may bring an action to establish a
right-of-way across land owned by others for a road or waterway
which is necessary to conduct mining operations upon the mining
claim.'" In any action to establish such right-of-way, the party
seeking the right-of-way must pay all costs and expenses, regardless of the outcome of the action. 1 6 If the court denies the request
for a right-of-way, it has discretionary authority to award attorney
fees to the landowner upon whose real property the right-of-way
was sought." 7
B.

Strip and Underground Mine Reclamation

Under the Montana Strip and Underground Mine Reclamation Act," 8 if a person obtains a court or administrative order of
noncompliance and suspension of operating permit on grounds of
environmental endangerment, 4 " against the operator of a coal or
uranium mine, then the person bringing the action may recover
attorney fees from the mine operator.150 The award of attorney
fees in such actions is left to the discretion of the court if the order
is issued through the judicial process, and to the Department of
State Lands if the order is issued as a result of administrative proceedings. 15' The statute also makes the possibility of receiving attorney fees reciprocal to a mine operator who prevails in any such
action.
144. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-112(5) (1983). Where both parties prevail in part, but
also both lose in part, neither party is entitled to attorney fees. Knudsen v. Taylor, Mont. __,
685 P.2d 354, 357 (1984).
145. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 82-2-201 through -203 (1983).
146. MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-2-211 (1983).
147. Id. Although not specifically stated in the statutes, it appears that the law of
rights-of-way for mineral rights owners includes owners of oil and gas rights. The 1981 Montana Legislature enacted MONT. CODE ANN. Title 82, ch. 10, part 5 (1983), regarding surface
owner damage and disruption compensation. MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-10-508 (1983) permits a
surface owner to bring suit if the oil company's offer of compensation for surface disruption
is unacceptable. The Legislature could provide a major incentive for oil companies to make
reasonable offers by amending § 82-10-508 to allow for an award of attorney fees to surface
owners who prevail in litigation.
148. MONT. CODE ANN. Title 82, ch. 4, part 2 (1983).
149. See generally MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-4-251 (1983).
150. MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-4-251(7) (1983).
151. Id.
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In addition to bringing an action against the mine operator, a
private party may bring a mandamus action against a public official to enforce the provisions of the Montana Strip and Underground Mine Reclamation Act. 152 As in other mandamus actions, 5 3
the moving party may recover attorney fees as part of the
damages."
C.

Accounting for Mineral Royalties

Whenever a mineral rights lessor brings an action to compel
an accounting by the lessee for all minerals produced under the
lessor's mineral rights, the district court must award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.' Although the statute providing for attorney fees in mineral rights accounting actions was
adopted in 1943, no cases have arisen under the attorney fees portion of the statute.
D.

Cancellation of Mineral Leases

A mineral rights lessee whose leasehold interest is cancelled or
forfeited is required to record a release of his interest, within sixty
days of the cancellation or forfeiture, with the clerk and recorder
of the county wherein the mineral rights lie.15 6 If the lessee fails to
record the release, the lessor first must make demand upon the
lessee to record the release within twenty days. 57 If the lessee then
refuses the lessor's demand, the lessor may bring an action both to
compel the release and for damages. 5 8 In any such action, the
court must award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing
15 9
party.
In determining the amount of attorney fees to be awarded, the
court may act upon its own knowledge regarding the value of the
152. MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-4-252 (1983).
153. See infra section XIV, subsection A for discussion of recovering attorney fees in
mandamus actions.

154.
155.

156.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-4-252(5) (1983).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-10-101(2), (4) (1983).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-1-201 (1983).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-1-203 (1983).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-1-202(1) (1983).

157.
158.
159. Id. As originally enacted, only the plaintiff/lessor could recover attorney fees if
successful. The nonreciprocal attorney fee provision was held to be an unconstitutional violation of the fourteenth amendment in Solberg v. Sunburst Oil & Gas Co., 73 Mont. 94, 109,
235 P. 761, 765 (1925). The supreme court reasoned that the nonreciprocal provision was
not a legitimate state police power, but "merely a remedy afforded for the enforcement of
private contracts." Id. Cf., supra text accompanying notes 12 and 13 (trend is towards accepting "plaintiffs only" attorney fees statutes as not being violative of equal protection
doctrine).
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attorney's services, notwithstanding the statutory provision that
"[i]ssues in regard to such fees shall be determined in the same
manner as other issues in such actions."'6 ° Where the lessor and
lessee each recover a portion of the relief for which they prayed,
the supreme court has ruled that neither party is required to pay
the other's attorney fees.'
E.

Mineral Rights of Unlocatable Persons

The 1979 Montana Legislature enacted legislation permitting
persons, holding an interest in the mineral rights of particular
property, to petition the district court for the creation of a trust,
the purpose of which is to hold the proceeds from the mineral
rights belonging to any other unlocatable person holding a mineral
interest in the same property." 2 If such trust is created and a
party other than the trustee holds such proceeds in excess of six
months, the holder is liable to the trust for all costs and attorney
6 3
fees incurred in recovering such proceeds for the trust.
F.

Hard-Rock Mining Local Government Impact

The 1981 Montana Legislature enacted legislation designed to
assist local governments in mitigating the initial financial impact
of large hard-rock mining projects.6 4 Included in the legislation
was a requirement that any potential hard-rock mining developer
whose project would employ 100 or more persons or cause a 15%
increase in the local population 5 must submit to the Hard-Rock
Mining Impact Board' 6 an impact plan describing the economic
impact the proposed mining development would have on the af160. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Guertzgen, 100 F.2d 299, 302-03 (9th Cir. 1938) (quoting REV. CODE MONT. § 6903 (1935)). The statute, now MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-1-202(1)
(1983), was amended to read "[i]ssues in regard to attorney's fees..." (emphasis added) in
1977, but the remainder of the sentence was not amended to reflect the Ninth Circuit's
holding in Stanolind. The Montana Supreme Court has never been asked to decide the
validity of the Stanolind interpretation.
161. Severson v. Barstow, 103 Mont. 526, 535, 63 P.2d 1022, 1025 (1936).
162.

MONT. CODE ANN.

§§

82-1-301 to -306 (1983).

163. MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-1-305(3) (1983). The Montana Supreme Court has held
that this statute is not in violation of the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause, for
the statute exercised a valid police power of the state, i.e., protecting the property of unlocatable owners of mineral rights. In re Montana Pacific Oil and Gas Co., - Mont..,
614 P.2d 1045, 1047 (1980). The court also held that the statute was not unconstitutionally
vague. Id. at
, 614 P.2d at 1048.
164. MONT. CODE ANN. Title 90, ch. 6, part 3 (1983).
165.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 90-6-302(4) (1983).

166.

Provided for at MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-1822 (1983).
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fected local government units. 167 If the affected local government
units formally object to the developer's impact plan as submitted,
and if the Hard-Rock Mining Impact Board or a court promulgates
a remedial order as a result of the objections, then the objecting
local government unit is entitled to attorney fees from the developer for "any administrative or judicial appeals" relating to the
impact plan."6 8
IX.

PROBATE AND RELATED PROCEEDINGS

The Montana version of the Uniform Probate Code 1 9 is
unique in that it statutorily establishes the amount which constitutes reasonable attorney fees for most probate proceedings. If
more than one attorney works on a particular probate project, only
one compensation, as fixed by the code, is allowed.1 70 If the attorney working on a probate finds it necessary to charge additional
fees for non-traditional services performed in connection with the
probate, the fees must be fixed by the court after notice, hearing,
171
and a showing of good cause.
In order to hasten closing of the probate, the Montana Uniform Probate Code provides that if an estate has not been closed
within two years of the date of death, and if good cause for such
failure cannot be shown, then the personal representative and his
attorney may be ordered to forfeit all their rights to
1 72
compensation.
A.

General Probate

Generally, an attorney may charge fees not to exceed 4 1/2 % of
the first $40,000 of the gross probate estate value, as reported for
federal estate tax or state inheritance tax purposes, and 3% of the
value of the estate in excess of $40,000.113 If the value of the estate
for federal estate tax purposes differs from the value for state inheritance tax purposes, the larger value is used to compute the
maximum attorney fees.' 7 1
167. MONT. CODE ANN. § 90-6-307(1) (1983).
168. MONT. CODE ANN. § 90-6-307(11) (1983). The wording of the statute is ambiguous
and should be amended to reflect legislative intent. It is not clear whether the objecting
local government unit is entitled to attorney fees in an original proceeding before the HardRock Mining Impact Board.
169. MONT. CODE ANN. Title 72, chs. 1 through 5 (1983).
170. MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-3-633(4) (1983).
171. Id. at § 72-3-633(5).
172. MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-3-1015 (1983). This section is not part of the Uniform Act.
173. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-3-633(1), 72-3-631(1) (1983).
174. Id. If no federal estate tax form is required to be filed because of the lack of
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Where an attorney who has completed part of the probate is
relieved of his duties by the personal representative, and the parties had an enforceable employment contract, the attorney is entitled to fees proportionate to the amount of work completed." 5 If
there was a valid employment contract with the fee based on a
percentage of the estate, quantum meruit is not an appropriate
measure of the attorney fees in a probate situation.'7 6
B.

Termination of Joint Tenancies

An attorney who provides services in connection with the termination of the decedent's joint tenancy interests is entitled to
fees not to exceed 3% of the value of the interest passing, provided
the surviving joint tenant is not also the surviving spouse. 177 If the
surviving joint tenant is the decedent's surviving spouse, the attorney fees for services rendered in terminating the joint tenancy are
78
limited to 2% of the interest passing to the surviving spouse.
C.

Termination of Life Estates

An attorney who renders services which terminate a life estate
is entitled to fees not to exceed 3 % of the value of the life estate in
connection with a probate or joint tenancy termination. 79 If, however, the life estate is terminated separately from a probate or
joint tenancy termination, the attorney rendering services is entitled to fees equal to 3% of the value of the life estate or $100,
whichever is greater.' 80
estate assets, apparently the maximum attorney fee is to be based on the applicable percentage of the amount reported for state inheritance tax purposes. This amount typically is
lower than the amount reported for federal estate tax purposes. Remarks of Professor E.
Edwin Eck, March 4, 1985.
175. In re Estate of Magelssen, 182 Mont. 372, 382, 597 P.2d 90, 95 (1979). The district court determined that the estate's original attorney had agreed to probate the estate
for 3% of the value for estate tax purposes. Because the contract provided for a fee within
the statutory limits, and because the district court had found the original attorney to have
completed 95% of the probate, the original attorney was awarded a fee equal to 95% of the
contracted fee.
176. Id. at 380, 597 P.2d at 95.
177. MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-3-633(2) (1983).
178. MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-16-505(2) (1983). This section is not part of the Uniform
Probate Code.
179. MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-3-633(3) (1983). It is not clear what the "value of a life
estate" is if the life tenant is dead. This statute probably should be amended to refer to
"3% of the value of the property subject to the life estate .
Remarks of Professor E.
Edwin Eck, March 4, 1985.
180. MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-3-633(3) (1983).
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D.

Guardianshipsand Conservatorships

Any visitor, physician, conservator, or attorney appointed by
the court in any guardianship or conservatorship proceeding, if not
otherwise compensated for services rendered, is entitled to reasonable compensation out of the assets of the estate.' 8 '
X.

INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF CORPORATIONS AND LIMITED
PARTNERSHIPS

A.

Denial of Shareholder Inspection Rights

A person who has been a corporate shareholder for at least six
months and who owns at least 5 % of the corporate stock is entitled, upon reasonable notice, to examine the corporate books,
records, and minutes, provided that he is attempting to obtain the
information for a proper purpose. " ' If the shareholder brings an
inspection rights action, and if the court finds that the corporate
officers wrongfully had refused a good faith request to inspect, the
corporation is liable to the shareholder for damages or other legal
remedies awarded by the court, plus costs and attorney fees." 3 The
statutory provision for awarding attorney fees appears mandatory,
and the corporation does not have a reciprocal right to recover attorney fees if it prevails.
B.

Determinationof Fair Value of Dissenters' Shares

If a dissenting shareholder exercises his right to demand a corporate buyout of his shares, and the dissenting shareholder formally demands more than the price offered by the corporation for
those shares, the corporation must file a petition in the district
court asking for a judicial determination of the fair value of the
shares.' 8 " If the corporation substantially failed to comply with the
statutory procedures 8 5 for exercising dissenters' rights, the court
may award the dissenting shareholder such attorney and expert
witness fees and expenses as the court deems equitable. 8 6 Even if
the corporation substantially complied with the statutory requirements, the court is required to award attorney and expert witness
fees if it determines that the party against whom the fees and ex181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

§ 72-5-432 (1983).
§ 35-1-513(2) (1983).
Id. at § 35-1-513(3).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-812(7), (8) (1983).
See id. at § 35-1-812(1) to (7).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-812(9)(b) (1983).
MONT. CODE ANN.
MONT. CODE ANN.
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penses are awarded acted arbitrarily, vexatiously, and in bad faith
with respect to the dissenters' rights." 7
C.

Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers for
Legal Expenses

Prior to 1981, Montana law essentially permitted corporations
to indemnify corporate directors and officers for legal expenses, including judgments, incurred in their capacities as directors and officers, but only if the director or officer was not determined by the
court to have been liable for negligence or misconduct.188 Although
alternative indemnification provisions could be provided in the articles of incorporation or the bylaws," 9 the pre-1981 provision was
too inflexible in light of the modern reality of lawsuits arising out
of conduct which formerly was accepted without question.'
The
1981 Montana Legislature adopted a more flexible, albeit more
complex, means for determining when indemnification is mandated, permitted, or prohibited.
If a corporate director, by reason of his status as a director, is
made a party to any legal action, and if he conducted himself in
good faith, reasonably believed that his conduct was in the best
interests of the corporation, and, in the case of a criminal proceeding, had no reasonable cause to believe that his conduct was criminal, then the director may be indemnified as follows:
1) If the director is wholly successful in the action, the corporation is required to indemnify the director for his reasonable expenses in defending the action,' including attorney fees, 92 unless
the articles of incorporation provide otherwise. If the corporation
refuses to indemnify the director, and the director prevails in an
action to compel indemnification, the corporation must pay the director's reasonable expenses of securing the indemnification, in ad9
dition to the indemnification;' '
2) If the director does not prevail in a derivative action, the
corporation may voluntarily indemnify the director for his expenses, including attorney fees, but not for any judgments, penalties, fines, or settlements for which the director is liable; 94 and
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

192.

Id.
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-108(15) (1979).
Id.
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-414 annot. (1984).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-414(4)(a)(i) (1983).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-414(1)(c) (1983) defines expenses to include attorney

fees.
193.

194.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-414(4)(a)(ii)(A) (1983).
Id. at § 35-1-414(2)(b).
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3) If the director does not prevail in an action brought by a
third party, the corporation may voluntarily indemnify him against
judgments, penalties, fines, settlements, and expenses, including
attorney fees. 9 '
Additionally, a director who did not prevail in an original action may petition the court for an order compelling the corporation
to indemnify. 9 ' If the court determines that the director fairly and
reasonably is entitled to indemnification, the court may order indemnification, but in derivative actions indemnification is limited
to the indemnified director's litigation expenses.' 97 Indemnification
of corporate officers is governed by the same rules that govern indemnification of directors.' 8
D.

Derivative Actions Involving Limited Partnerships

If a limited partner succeeds, in whole or in part, in a derivative action against the limited partnership, the court may award, in
addition to any damages or order of accounting, reasonable expenses, including attorney fees.' 99 The provision allowing for attorney fees is discretionary, not mandatory, and apparently does not
allow a reciprocal right of attorney fees to limited partnerships
which prevail in such actions.
XI.
A.

WORK-RELATED ACTIONS

Indemnification of Private Employees

An employer generally must indemnify his employee for all of
the direct consequential expenses or losses incurred by the employee in discharging his employment duties.2 00 Although the issue
never has faced the Montana Supreme Court, general principles of
agency law entitle the employee to indemnification from the employer for reasonable attorney fees and other necessary expenses
incurred in litigating third-party claims arising out of the employee's good faith performance of his employment duties.2"'
Because the plaintiff in a claim against an employee usually
names the employer as a party defendant, the employer generally
195. Id.
196. Id. at § 35-1-414(4)(a)(ii)(B).
197. Id.
198. Id. at § 35-1-414(9).
199. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-12-1404 (1983).
200. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-701 (1983).
201. 3 C.J.S. Agency § 322 (1973).
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hires the attorney who represents both employer and employee. An
employee who hires his own counsel when his employer already has
hired competent counsel to defend both employer and employee is
not entitled to indemnification for such unnecessary expense. 0 2
The employee generally is forced to seek indemnification only
where he has notified the employer of the pending action, but the
employer has refused to defend.2 0 3 If the employee failed to give
notice of the pending action to the employer, in order to be indemnified the employee must prove that he maintained a reasonable
defense.20 4
Although the right to indemnification for attorney fees and litigation expenses in third-party actions vests regardless of the case
outcome, the right does not extend to actions brought by the employer against the employee for nonfeasance or malfeasance of employment duties.20 5
B.

Indemnification of Government Employees

A governmental employee is entitled to indemnification from
his employer for money judgments and legal expenses incurred in
defending a noncriminal action arising out of the employment, including attorney fees either charged to the employee or awarded to
the opposing party.20 6 The government employee, however, is not
entitled to indemnification if his conduct constituted oppression,
fraud, malice, or criminal activity, or if he was acting outside the
scope of his employment, or if he unreasonably failed to cooperate
in the defense of the case, or if he settled the case without the
consent of the government employer.20 7
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See Sunset-Sternau Food Co. v. Bonzi, 60 Cal. 2d 834, 840, 389 P.2d 133, 140, 36
Cal. Rptr. 741, 748 (1964).
205. 3 C.J.S. Agency § 322 (1973).
206. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-305(4) (1983).
207. Id. at § 2-9-305(6). This subsection apparently was adopted in response to
Dvorak v. Huntley Project Irrigation Dist., - Mont. -, 639 P.2d 62 (1981), in which
the supreme court ruled that the government agency was responsible for punitive damages
awarded against two employees who intentionally denied irrigation water to a farmer. The
denial of water occurred after the adoption of the 1972 Montana Constitution, which abolished sovereign immunity except where specifically provided by the Legislature, MONT.
CONST. art. II, § 18, but before the adoption in 1977 of MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-105 (1983),
which makes government entities immune from punitive damages.
Prior to the adoption of MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-305(6) (1983), the government employee was entitled to indemnification unless the claim was based on an intentional tort or a
felonious act.
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C.

Wage Claims

If an employee brings an action to recover wages due, the
court must award attorney fees to the prevailing party, 0 8 even if
no specific prayer for attorney fees was made in the pleadings.2 " 9 In
order to recover attorney fees, however, formal legal action to recover wages must be taken; attorney fees are not available to an
employee who prevails on a mere administrative wage claim.21 0
The right to recover attorney fees runs with the wage claim,
therefore an assignment of a wage claim carries with it the right to
recover attorney fees.2 ' If, however, various assigned wage claims
are consolidated in a single action, reasonable attorney fees are
those necessary to prosecute or defend the consolidated action, and
not the total of attorney fees which would have been incurred if
the wage claims had been tried independently.2 1 The right to recover attorney fees in wage claim actions extends to actions in
quanLum meruit for reasonable value of services2 13 and to wage
claim actions based on implied employment contracts.21 4 The right
does not extend, however, to claims for reimbursement of out-ofpocket expenses.21 5
D.

Deceptive Employment Practices

Employers in Montana may not influence workers to change
from one place of employment to another by means of deception
regarding work character or working conditions. 1 6 The definition
of deception regarding working conditions includes the failure to
state in employment advertisements or contracts the fact that the
employer currently is involved in a labor dispute at the proposed
place of employment. 2 7
Any worker hired as a result of such deceptive employment
practices is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees, in addition
to all damages sustained as a consequence of such deceptive hiring
practices."' Apparently, the statute is mandatory, and the em208.
209.
210.
621 P.2d
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-3-214(1) (1983).
Swanson v. Gnose, 106 Mont. 262, 266, 76 P.2d 643, 645 (1938).
Thornton v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Labor and Indus., __
1062, 1066 (1980).
Meister v. Farrow, 109 Mont. 1, 20, 92 P.2d 753, 762 (1939).

Mont.

__

Id.
Britt v. Cotter Butte Mines, 108 Mont. 174, 178-79, 89 P.2d 266, 268 (1939).
McNulty v. Bewley Corp., 182 Mont. 260, 265-66, 596 P.2d 474, 477 (1979).
Johnston v. K & T Mfg., Inc., __
Mont. -,
625 P.2d 66, 67-68 (1981).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-303(1) (1983).
Id.
Id. at § 39-2-303(2).
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ployer is not afforded a reciprocal right to attorney fees if he
prevails in the action.
E.

Workers' Compensation Benefits

If a claimant applies for workers' compensation benefits and
the insurer"' denies liability for the claim or terminates compensation benefits, and the workers' compensation judge or the supreme
court subsequently finds the claim compensable, the insurer is required to pay the claimant's reasonable costs and attorney fees. 2
The claimant's right to recover attorney fees under this rule extends not merely to total denials of claims, but also to successful
claims for total disability benefits when the insurer only offered
partial disability benefits;2 2 1 to successful claims where the insurer
initially paid claimant's temporary benefits from the date of accident until his return to work, but wrongfully denied the claimant
benefits when his condition deteriorated over time and he sought
permanent total disability benefits two years following his initial
compensable accident;22 2 to successful claims where the insurer initially offered minor compensation to settle the claim on a disputed
liability basis, but the Workers' Compensation Court found the
claim to be fully compensable, and the insurer appealed to the supreme court, but subsequently dismissed its appeal;22 3 and to
claims where the insurer initially paid benefits to the claimant, but
subsequently wrongfully suspended the claimant's benefits.2 24
The purpose of the statute allowing for an award of attorney
fees in workers' compensation cases is two-fold. First, it preserves
intact an award of compensation recovered by the claimant for his
injury, thereby fully protecting an injured worker against disability
from a work-related injury and placing total economic responsibility, including the expense of obtaining compensation, upon the industry employing the injured worker.2 2 5 Second, it penalizes an insurer that cavalierly denies 'a legitimate claim or terminates a
219. "Insurer," as used in this subsection, refers to every insurer under MONT. CODE
ANN. Title 39, ch. 71, part 21 (self-insured employers), part 22 (private insurance companies
representing employers), and part 23 (the state insurance fund). See McMillen v. Arthur G.
McKee & Co., 166 Mont. 400, 408-09, 533 P.2d 1095, 1099 (1975).
220. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-611 (1983).
221. Myers v. 4 B's Rest., Inc., 172 Mont. 159, 161, 561 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1977).
222. Wight v. Hughes Livestock Co., Inc., - Mont. , 634 P.2d 1189, 1193 (1981)
(hereinafter referred to as Wight I).
223. Paulson v. Bozeman Deaconess Foundation Hosp.,
- Mont. -, 673 P.2d
1281, 1283-84 (1984).
224. Smith v. Pierce Packing Co., 177 Mont. 267, 273, 581 P.2d 834, 837 (1978).
225. Wight v. Hughes Livestock Co., Mont. -, 664 P.2d 303, 309 (1983) (hereinafter referred to as Wight II).
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claimant's benefits.226 The Workers' Compensation Court must
award the claimant attorney fees when the insurer wrongfully denies or terminates benefits, but the insurer has no reciprocal right
to attorney fees.22
Where the basic controversy between the insurer and the
claimant relates to the amount of compensation due, rather than
to the claimant's right to compensation, and the amount awarded
by the Workers' Compensation Court or the Workers' Compensation Division exceeds the amount paid or offered by the insurer,
then the court or division may award reasonable attorney fees to
the claimant.228 The awarding of any such fees is discretionary, and
must be based solely upon the difference between the amount ultimately recovered by the claimant and the amount offered by the
insurer."'
Three somewhat conflicting statutes grant authority to determine what constitutes reasonable attorney fees in workers' compensation cases. Section 39-7-611 of the Montana Code Annotated
gives such authority to the workers' compensation judge, alone, in
cases where the insurer has wrongfully denied a claim or terminated benefits. Section 39-71-612 of the Montana Code Annotated
grants authority alternately to the workers' compensation judge
and to the Workers' Compensation Division to determine reasonable attorney fees in disputes over the amount of compensation
when the insurer has admitted to some liability on the claim, but
disputes the amount of compensation requested by the claimant.
Section 39-71-613(2) of the Montana Code Annotated grants the
administrator of the Workers' Compensation Division discretionary authority to "regulate the amount of the attorney's fees in any
workers' compensation case."
The Montana Supreme Court implicitly adopted the latter
statute as controlling in its second review of Wight v. Hughes Livestock Co. (hereinafter Wight 11)230 when it reversed the Workers'
Compensation Court's determination of "reasonable" attorney fees
and remanded the case for a redetermination of attorney fees.
226. Schumacher v. Empire Steel Mfg., Co., 175 Mont. 411, 415, 574 P.2d 987, 989
(1977).
227. The Montana Supreme Court has held that the provision of MONT. CODE ANN. §
39-71-611 (1983) which permits a prevailing claimant to recover attorney fees, while denying
a prevailing insurer the same privilege, is not a violation of the equal protection clause of
either the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution or MONT. CONST. art. II,
§ 4. See supra text accompanying notes 13 and 14.
228. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-612(1) (1983).
229. Id.
230.
- Mont. -, 664 P.2d 303, 312 (1983).
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Wight and his attorney originally entered a contingent fee arrangement whereby the attorney would receive 25% of any benefits recovered by Wight. The Workers' Compensation Court originally
ruled that, contrary to the insurer's contentions, Wight's claim was
compensable, that he was entitled to lifetime benefits of approximately $89,791.85,31 and that he was entitled to reasonable attorney fees. The insurer unsuccessfully appealed to the supreme court
in the first Wight v. Hughes Livestock Co. (hereinafter Wight I).32
After the Wight I decision, Wight and his attorney renegotiated
the contingency fee arrangement to allow the attorney fees equal
to 40% of Wight's recovery.2"' On remand for purposes of determining attorney fees, the Workers' Compensation Court awarded
Wight $8,500 in attorney fees, even though the original contingency fee contract would have allowed Wight's attorney fees of
$22,447.96 and the renegotiated contingency contract would have
allowed Wight's attorney fees of $35,916.74.
In ruling that the Workers' Compensation Court had abused
its discretion in awarding Wight only $8,500 in attorney fees, the
supreme court in Wight II addressed Montana's "net recovery concept" of awarding attorney fees, over and above any benefits
awarded, to prevailing claimants in disputed workers' compensation cases. 23 ' The supreme court recognized the conflict between
section 39-71-611 of the Montana Code Annotated, which allows
the Workers' Compensation Court to establish "reasonable" attorney fees if the insurer has wrongfully denied a claim, and section
39-71-613(2) of the Montana Code Annotated, which authorizes
the Workers' Compensation Division to establish "reasonable" attorney fees "in any workers' compensation case." The supreme
court noted, however, that section 611 originally gave the Workers'
Compensation Division authority to establish "reasonable" attorney fees in cases where the insurer wrongfully denied the claim. 3' 5
Only since the 1979 amendments to section 611 has the Workers'
Compensation Court had authority to determine "reasonable" attorney fees in cases involving wrongful denial of claims. Because,
prior to the 1979 amendment to section 611, the Workers' Compensation Division had adopted administrative rules 36 limiting
contingency fees in all workers' compensation cases, the Wight If
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Wight II Appellant's Brief, p. 5.
Mont. -, 634 P.2d 1189 (1981).
Wight II, - Mont. at
, 664 P.2d at 305.
Id. at -,
664 P.2d at 306-09.
Id. at
, 664 P.2d at 311.
MONT. ADMIN. R. 24.29.3801 (1983).
__
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court determined that the division's administrative rules should be
used as a guideline by the Workers' Compensation Court
in deter37
mining reasonable attorney fees for Wight's attorney.
The Workers' Compensation Division rules limit contingency
fees to 25% of the amount of the benefits if the case never goes to
a hearing before the workers' compensation judge, 33% of the
amount of the benefits if the claimant is forced to litigate his claim
before the workers' compensation judge, and 40% of the amount of
the benefits if the case is appealed and the supreme court finds
that the claimant is entitled to benefits. In addition to the contingency fee schedule, the Wight 11 court recited various other factors
to be considered by the Workers' Compensation Court in determining "reasonable" attorney fees. 2 3s The supreme court implied,
however, that those other factors should be secondary to the factor
of "the market value of the lawyer's services at the time and place
39
2

involved."

Because the Workers' Compensation Division obviously had
considered its contingency fee limits to represent reasonable contingency fee rates,2 40 and because the contract between Wight and

his attorney fell within those limits, the supreme court stated that
such a contingency fee agreement should enjoy a strong presumption that it represents "reasonable" attorney fees in a workers'
compensation case."41 The court further stated that if the workers'
compensation judge does not set attorney fees in accordance with a
contingency fee contract adopted in harmony with the Workers'
Compensation Division rules, then the workers' compensation
judge "shall state with particularity his reasons in writing, based
upon strong countervailing evidence, why the contingent fee contract is not followed by him, and precisely what weight he accorded
237.
238.
"(1)
"(2)
"(3)
"(4)
"(5)
"(6)
"(7)
"(8)
"(9)

Wight H, - Mont. at __,
664 P.2d at 311-12.
Those factors are as follows:
The anticipated time and labor required to perform the legal service properly.
The novelty and difficulty of legal issues involved in the matter.
The fees customarily charged for similar legal services.
The possible total recovery if successful.
The time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances of the case.
The nature and length of the attorney-client relationship.
The experience, skill and reputation of the attorney. The ability of the client to pay for the legal services rendered.
The risk of no recovery."
Wight H, - Mont. at __,
664 P.2d at 312 (quoting Clark v. Sage, 102 Idaho 261, 265,
629 P.2d 657, 661 (1981)).
239. Wight H, - Mont. at __,
664 P.2d at 311-12.
240. Id. at
, 664 P.2d at 311.
241. Id. at
, 664 P.2d at 312.
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to the contingent fee contract."2'42
Although the supreme court effectively ruled that contingency
fee agreements between the workers' compensation claimant and
his attorney are binding upon the insurer which is later found liable for attorney fees, the court did not allow Wight's attorney to
recover on the renegotiated contingency fee contract. The court
reasoned that the confidential relationship between the attorney
and the claimant prohibited the attorney from using, or giving the
appearance of using, his position to influence the renegotiation of
the contingency fee arrangement.24 Because the insurer subrogates
to the duties of the claimant with respect to contingent attorney
fees, the insurer may also exercise the rights of the claimant with
regard to the contingency fee arrangement.
It should be noted that section 39-71-613(1) of the Montana
Code Annotated requires an attorney representing a workers' compensation claimant to file a copy of the employment contract with
the Workers' Compensation Division. Failure to file as required results in the attorney's automatic forfeiture of his right to recover
attorney fees in that particular workers' compensation action.2 44
By properly filing a copy of the employment contract with the
Workers' Compensation Division, however, the attorney acquires a
lien for payment of fees which attaches in advance upon the claimant's benefits. 4 5 Neither the Legislature, nor the Workers' Compensation Court, nor the Workers' Compensation Division has
adopted a deadline for filing a copy of the employment contract. In
at least one instance the supreme court has indicated that the absence of such a rule makes enforcement of the forfeiture provision
difficult.2 46 Nevertheless, an attorney representing workers' compensation claimants should always file a copy of the employment
contract with the Workers' Compensation Division as soon as the
contract is entered.
242.

Id.

243.

Id.

244. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-613(3) (1983). The Wight II court urged the Workers'
Compensation Division to promulgate rules requiring copies of such contracts to be filed
with the insurer or employer, and to establish a procedure for the insurer to contest the
reasonableness of the contingency fee arrangement. Wight II, - Mont. at __,
664 P.2d
at 313. As of the date of this writing, the Workers' Compensation Division has not promulgated any such rules.
245. Kelleher Law Office v. State Compensation Ins. Fund,
823, 825 (1984).
246.

Hock v. Lienco Cedar Prod.,

-
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Subrogation in Workers' Compensation

If an injured worker brings an action against a third party for
injuries suffered in the employment context, the workers' compensation insurer is entitled to subrogation2 47 for all compensation and
benefits it either has paid or eventually will pay.2 48 If the worker
notifies the insurer of his intent to bring an action against a third
party,24 9 and if the worker requests the insurer's proportionate
contribution towards prosecuting the action against the third
party, 5 ' the insurer must pay a proportionate share of the costs
and attorney fees necessary in prosecuting the action. If the insurer refuses to pay a proportionate share of the costs and attorney
fees, then it is entitled only to 50% subrogation.25 1
In order to preserve its right to 100% subrogation, the insurer's response to the worker's request for proportionate financial
assistance in bringing the claim "should be explicit, immediate and
without reservation."2 5 2 Such unequivocal response allows the
worker's attorney to properly evaluate the claim for his client. It
also assures the worker that the costs will be shared if the action
2 53
against the third party is unsuccessful.
247. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-414(1) (1983). "Subrogation" is the right of one who
has paid what another should have paid to recover the payment from the party justly responsible. Swanson v. Champion Int'l Corp., 197 Mont. 509, 519, 646 P.2d 1166, 1171 (1982).
248. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-414(1) (1983). If the injured worker fails to bring an
action against the third party within one year of the injury, the insurer may bring such
action in the name of the worker. Id. at § 39-71-414(3). The insurer has no right to bring
such action until one full year has lapsed since the injury. Sorum v. Rieder & Co.,
Mont. __,
666 P.2d 1221, 1224 (1983).
It should be noted that while the insurer has subrogation rights in a survival action, it
does not have subrogation rights in a wrongful death action. Swanson, 197 Mont. at 523, 646
P.2d at 1173. The key distinctions are that a survival action is personal to the decedent,
accrues during the decedent's lifetime, is subject to decedent's creditors' claims, and may be
prosecuted after decedent's death only by his personal representative; but a wrongful death
action is personal to the decedent's survivors (usually spouse and children), vests only upon
the decedent's death, and is not subject to claims against the decedent or his estate. Id. at
515-18, 646 P.2d at 1169-70.
249.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-414(2)(a) (1983).

250.

Id. at § 39-71-414(2)(b).

251. Id. at § 39-71-414(2)(c). Regardless of whether the insurer agrees to proportionate
indemnification for the worker's attorney fees, the worker is entitled to at least one-third of
the judgment against the third party, minus a proportionate amount for the worker's attorney fees, if the judgment against the third party is insufficient to provide the worker with
that amount after payment of the insurer's subrogation claim. Id. at § 39-71-414(2)(d).
252.

Sorum v. Rieder & Co.,

253.

Id.

-

Mont. at

__,

666 P.2d at 1224.
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Occupational Disease Benefits

The Montana Occupation Disease Act 254 allows for compensation of workers who contract work-related diseases, or who have
inert work-related diseases, even though no injury, as defined by
the workers' compensation laws,255 has occurred. 5 6 The Occupational Disease Act incorporates a net-recovery doctrine similar to
that found in the Workers' Compensation Act. If an insurer denies
an occupational disease claim and requests that the Workers' Compensation Division hold a hearing, and if the claim is determined
compensable by the division, then the insurer must pay the claimant's reasonable attorney fees, as determined by the Workers'
Compensation Division.257 If the insurer appeals the decision of the
Workers' Compensation Division to the workers' compensation
judge or the supreme court, and the claim is ultimately determined
compensable, the insurer must pay the claimant's reasonable attorney fees, in addition to costs and any benefits awarded.258
If the insurer is found liable for the claimant's occupational
disease claim, and is required to pay the claimant's attorney fees,
then section 39-72-712 of the Montana Code Annotated sets forth
a payment schedule for those fees. It permits the insurer to pay
the claimant's attorney fees in reasonable weekly installments, in
the same manner as it pays the claimant's benefits.25
XII.

AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY CLAIMS AND OTHER INSURANCE
MATTERS

The general rule in Montana is that an insurance policy beneficiary who successfully maintains an action against the insurer to
recover amounts due under the insurance policy is not entitled to
attorney fees, unless there is a statutory or contractual provision to
the contrary.26 °
254. MONT. CODE ANN. Title 39, ch. 72 (1983).
255. "Injury" is defined under the Workers' Compensation Act generally as "a tangible happening of a traumatic nature from an unexpected cause or unusual strain resulting in
either external or internal physical harm," MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-119(1) (1983), and
generally does not include work-related diseases. The mere fact that a worker has a compensable claim under the Occupational Disease Act, however, does not necessarily preclude his
recovery under the Workers' Compensation Act. Ridenour v. Equity Supply Co., Mont.
-.
665 P.2d 783, 786 (1983).
256. Greger v. United Prestress, Inc., 180 Mont. 348, 354, 590 P.2d 1121, 1124 (1983).
257. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-72-613(1) (1983).
258. Id. at § 39-72-613(2).
259. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-72-712 (1983) is noteworthy mainly for its inherent lack of
clarity. No cases have been decided under this statute.
260. Martin v. Crown Life Ins. Co., - Mont. __,
658 P.2d 1099, 1104 (1983).
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Automobile Liability Claims

A.

The 1981 Montana Legislature amended the general rule for
purposes of some automobile liability claims. Section 25-10-303 of
the Montana Code Annotated provides that, if a plaintiff obtains a
judgment equal to or greater than the amount of property damage
claimed by him in his last written offer to the defendant or defendant's agent prior to the filing of the action, the plaintiff is entitled
to recover attorney fees from the defendant. If the defendant or
his agent fails to respond to the plaintiff's written offer within fifteen days of the response date requested by the plaintiff, the plaintiff may consider such failure to respond a total rejection of the
offer and bring an action. 61 If the plaintiff is successful in his action, he is entitled to recover attorney fees from the defendant.2 62
It should be noted that this exception to the general rule applies
out of
only to actions solely involving damages to property arising
26 3
automobile.
an
of
maintenance
or
the ownership, use,
B.

Unfair Trade Practices by Insurance Companies

Plaintiffs prevailing in bad faith actions against insurance
companies might be entitled to recover attorney fees in addition to
other damages awarded by the jury. Section 33-18-201 of the Montana Code Annotated gives rise to the tort of bad faith on the part
of insurance companies in Montana. 2" That section is part of Title
33, chapter 16 of the Montana Code Annotated, the purpose of
which "is to regulate trade practices in the business of insurance
. . .by defining or providing for determination of all such practices in this state which constitute unfair methods of competition
or unfair or deceptive acts or practices ....,,265 Section 33-18201(1) of the Montana Code Annotated prohibits unfair insurance
trade practices, independent of the general prohibition of unfair
trade practices under section 30-14-103 of the Montana Code Annotated. 266 However, neither section 30-14-103 of the Montana
Code Annotated, which outlaws unfair trade practices, nor sections
30-14-104 and -105 of the Montana Code Annotated, which limit
the scope of section 30-14-103, exempt insurance companies from
261.

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
under the

MONT. CODE ANN.

Id.
Id.
Klaudt v. Flink,

§

25-10-303 (1983).

Mont. -, 658 P.2d 1065, 1067 (1983).
33-18-101 (1983) (emphasis added).
See supra section III, subsection A, for discussion of recovering attorney fees
Montana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act of 1973, MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-101 to -142 (1983).
-

MONT. CODE ANN.

§
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section 30-14-103 and other related provisions of the Montana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act of 1973. If indeed insurance companies are subject to the Montana Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act of 1973, then an insurer that
engages in any of the acts prohibited by section 33-18-201 of the
Montana Code Annotated could be held liable under section 30-14133 of the Montana Code Annotated for the reasonable attorney
fees of one who prevails in a bad faith action against his insurance
company. The Montana Supreme Court has not yet addressed this
precise issue.
C.

Unauthorized Insurance Companies

In an action to recover amounts due under an insurance policy, brought against an insurance company that is doing business
in Montana without first having been issued a subsisting certificate
of authority by the commissioner of insurance, the court may allow
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing plaintiff if the unauthorized insurer's refusal to make payment was vexatious and without
reasonable cause.2 7 This discretionary power to award attorney
fees does not permit the court to award attorney fees to the prevailing unauthorized insurer.

XIII.

FAMILY LAW

In any proceeding arising under the Montana Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (hereinafter UMDA), 268 the district court,
after considering the financial resources of both parties, may order
26 9
one party to pay the other party's reasonable attorney fees.
A.

The Dissolution Decree

Although the attorney fees provision of the UMDA applies to
several issues, most of the cases arising under that provision relate
to the awarding of attorney fees as part of the final dissolution
decree. Prior to the adoption of the UMDA, Montana statutory
law provided that the court, in its discretion, could require the
husband to pay the wife's attorney fees in divorce actions.2 70 Although the former provision, on its face, was partial towards the
wife, the courts consistently required a showing of necessity before
§ 33-1-616 (1983).
The Montana version of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act is found at
MONT. CODE ANN. Title 40, chs. 1 and 4 (1983).
269. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-110 (1983).
270. REV. CODE MONT. § 21-137 (1947).
267.
268.

MONT. CODE ANN.
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awarding attorney fees. 271
Under the UMDA, a showing of necessity also is prerequisite
to the awarding of attorney fees.2 72 Although the Montana Supreme Court has held that an "award of attorney fees must be
based on a hearing allowing for oral testimony, the introduction of
exhibits, and an opportunity to cross-examine in which the reasonableness of the attorney fees claim is demonstrated, 2 7s the court
occasionally has upheld an award of "nominal" attorney fees, made
without a hearing to determine the reasonableness of the award.27 4
As evidenced by various supreme court cases, determination of
"nominal" attorney fees is an inexact science. In Bailey v. Bailey,275 the supreme court upheld the district court's award, without
a hearing, of $350 to the wife for attorney fees in a dissolution action where the two major issues were relatively simple. The Bailey
court reasoned that the fee was "nominal" and that the trial court
was aware of the parties' relative financial status. 276 Four weeks
2 7 7 the court overturned the dislater, in Phennicie v. Phennicie,
27
trict court's 1 award, without a hearing, of $500 to the wife for
attorney fees in a dissolution action where the major issues were
quite complex in comparison to the issues in Bailey. The Phennicie court made no mention of whether the attorney fees awarded
by the district court were nominal; rather, the court stated that the
wife's inability to pay her attorney fees was insufficient evidence to
substantiate the $500 award.2 79 More recently, the court in In re
Marriageof Chapin280 upheld the district court's award of $400 in
attorney fees to the wife without first holding an evidentiary hearing. The supreme court acknowledged its rule in Phennicie that an
evidentiary hearing should always be conducted, but reasoned that
the award of attorney fees was so small that it did not justify a
reversal for rehearing of the attorney fees issue.28 1
Regardless of the cases in which awards of attorney fees made
271. See, e.g., Whitman v. Whitman, 164 Mont. 124, 132, 519 P.2d 966, 969 (1974);
Bordeaux v. Bordeaux, 29 Mont. 478, 482, 75 P. 359, 361 (1904).
272. In re Marriage of Brown, 179 Mont. 417, 427, 587 P.2d 361, 367 (1978).
273. In re Marriage of Aanenson, 183 Mont. 229, 236, 598 P.2d 1120, 1124 (1979).
274. See, e.g., Bailey v. Bailey, 184 Mont. 418, 422, 603 P.2d 259, 261 (1979); Solie v.
Solie, 172 Mont. 132, 137-38, 561 P.2d 443, 447 (1977).
275. 184 Mont. at 422, 603 P.2d at 261.
276. Id.
277. 185 Mont. 120, 128, 604 P.2d 787, 791 (1979).
278. Ironically, the district court judge whose ruling was affirmed in Bailey was the
same judge whose ruling was reversed in Phennicie.
279. Id.
, 655 P.2d 991, 992 (1982).
Mont. 280. __
281. Id.
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without an evidentiary hearing have been upheld, it clearly is advisable to request attorney fees in the dissolution pleadings.28 2 Unless an attorney fees payment arrangement is stipulated by the
parties and approved by the court,28 3 one also should request an
evidentiary hearing to determine which party is responsible for the
attorney fees.
Provided the evidentiary hearing has been held, the decision
to award attorney fees in a marital dissolution action is largely left
to the discretion of the trial court.2" 4 Any award of attorney fees,
however, must be based upon competent evidence sufficient to support such an award.28 5 If either party to the dissolution has made a
formal request for an award of attorney fees, the court must indicate in its written findings of fact, conclusions of law, or order
whether or not such attorney fees have been granted, and the reasons for refusing to grant 286 or for granting8 7 such attorney fees.
In assigning responsibility for attorney fees in a dissolution action, the court may consider the relative earning potential and
health of the parties, 8 8 the parties' relative financial status under
the property settlement decree,2 89 the parties' relative contribution
to the marital estate, and any other relevant factors included in
the UMDA. 9 ° In short, the award of attorney fees in marital cases
should be based on the case as a whole.2 91 A court, however, should
not consider the parties' rate of success on various claims raised in
the proceedings.2 92
If the district court has conducted an evidentiary hearing, the
Montana Supreme Court traditionally has been reluctant to reverse district court rulings regarding attorney fees in dissolution
actions.2 93 Recently, however, the supreme court in In re Marriage
282. In re Marriage of Johnsrud, 175 Mont. 117, 126, 572 P.2d 902, 907 (1977).
283. An attorney fees payment arrangement set by the district court and stipulated to
by the parties was approved as a substitute for the evidentiary hearing in Downs v. Downs,
181 Mont. 163, 167-68, 592 P.2d 938, 941 (1979).
284. Brown, 179 Mont. at 427, 587 P.2d at 367.
285. In re Marriage of Houtchens, 181 Mont. 70, 76, 592 P.2d 158, 162 (1979).
286. In re Marriage of Bowman, - Mont. -, 633 P.2d 1198, 1202 (1981).
287. Duffey v. Duffey,
Mont. __,
631 P.2d 697, 699 (1981).
288. In re Marriage of Carr, - Mont. -, 667 P.2d 425, 427 (1983).
289. In re Marriage of McGill, __
Mont. , 609 P.2d 278, 282 (1980), rev'd on
other grounds, __
Mont. -, 637 P.2d 1182 (1981).
290. In re Marriage of Collett,
Mont. -, 621 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1981).
291. Baer v. Baer, - Mont. __,
647 P.2d 835, 841 (1982).
292. Id.
293. The Montana Supreme Court has upheld an award of attorney fees against a
healthy husband whose earning capacity was shown to be three times that of his unhealthy
wife, even though the wife was awarded child custody and monthly maintenance. Carr, Mont. at
-, 667 P.2d at 427. The supreme court also has upheld an award of $1,500
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of Vert, 294 reversed the district court's award of attorney fees, even
though the district court had held an evidentiary hearing. The supreme court reasoned that the district court should not have
awarded attorney fees to the wife because she had monthly income
$250 in excess of her monthly expenses, and because the husband's
monthly income equalled his monthly expenses.2 95 Vert may portend a willingness of the supreme court to reverse awards of attorney fees in dissolution cases where the district court has held an
evidentiary hearing, but exercised imperfect discretion.
It should be noted that a party represented in a dissolution
action by the Legal Services Association may not recover attorney
fees, because that party has incurred no personal expense. 96
B.

Post-Decree Matters

A court, after considering the financial resources of both parties, may award attorney fees for legal services or costs incurred
prior to the commencement of the dissolution or after the entry of
judgment.2 9 In determining whether to award attorney fees in
post-decree proceedings, the courts typically consider the relative
financial situations of the parties, as well as any aggravating circumstances which led to the post-decree litigation. For example,
district courts routinely grant attorney fees to mothers who must
towards the wife's attorney fees where she had only $12 in her bank account at the time of
trial, she was earning $100 to $125 per month as a cosmetics salesperson, and she was
awarded a one quarter share of the $400,000 marital estate. In re Marriage of Kaasa, 181
Mont. 18, 25-26, 591 P.2d 1110, 1114 (1979). In another instance, the supreme court upheld
an award to the wife of $1,591 in attorney fees and costs, even though the district court also
awarded the wife 78% of the existing marital estate plus one-third of the husband's retirement benefits. In re Marriage of Laster, 197 Mont. 470, 479, 643 P.2d 597, 602 (1982). The
award of attorney fees and costs included an amount contained in an uncontested affidavit
which stated the wife's costs of travelling from Pennsylvania to Montana to contest the
dissolution action. Id. The supreme court also has upheld the awarding of attorney fees to
the wife where the husband refused to supply the district court with necessary financial
information. In re Marriage of Dahl, - Mont. __,
612 P.2d 196, 198 (1980). The district
court based its award upon the wife's testimony that she could not afford to pay her attorney and that her husband was a good welder and mechanic. Id.
The supreme court has upheld a district court decision denying attorney fees to the
wife where she had been employed for two years, had received 40% of the marital estate,
and had testified that she was capable of supporting herself. In re Marriage of Knudson, 186
Mont. 8, 17, 606 P.2d 130, 135 (1980). The court also has upheld a district court's denial of
attorney fees to a wife who received only 40% of the marital estate and whose only employment in the previous thirty years had been on the family ranch. In re Marriage of Owen, 187
Mont. 214, 218, 609 P.2d 292, 295 (1980).
294. Mont. -, 680 P.2d 587, 588 (1984).
295. Id.
296. In re Marriage of Thompson, Mont. .. 630 P.2d 243, 244 (1981).
297. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-110 (1983).
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hire lawyers in order to recover delinquent child support payments.2 98 Because mothers who must seek court-ordered support
payments generally are in financial positions inferior to those of
the delinquent fathers, and because the delinquent fathers have
breached their moral and legal obligations to support their children, awards of attorney fees to the mothers are justified on the
basis of both financial necessity and the aggravating circumstances
of nonpayment.
Financial necessity, rather than relative success of the litigation, is the dominant factor in courts awarding attorney fees in
post-decree matters. The supreme court has approved a district
court's award of $750 attorney fees to a mother who obtained a
court order for increased child support payments. 99 On the other
hand, the court has refused to uphold an award of attorney fees to
an employed custodial husband who successfully defended against
an attempt by his indigent wife to get a court-ordered modification
of the child custody decree.30 0
If the moving party's attempt to modify the custody decree is
determined to be vexatious and to constitute harassment, then the
non-moving party is entitled to attorney fees as a matter of law.301
3 0 ' the supreme court upheld the district
In Easton v. Easton,
court's award of $1,372.75 to the custodial wife for attorney fees in
a vexatious and harassing custodial decree modification action
brought by the husband. Determining what is vexatious and
harassing is left to the discretion of the district court.3 03 Where the
petition for modification of the custody decree merely lacks merit,
but is not determined to be vexatious or harassing, the court may
exercise its discretion and not award attorney fees. 304
Occasionally in post-decree matters a party's negligent or wanton disregard for its responsibilities under the property settlement
or dissolution decree can give rise to an award of attorney fees.
Even though the wife admittedly was self-supporting, the court in
298. Telephone inverview with John McRae, Attorney for the Montana Department of
Revenue Child Support Enforcement Bureau (CSEB), November 9, 1984. The CSEB typically does not recover attorney fees from delinquent fathers, partly because CSEB does not
have the staff to keep formal billing records on individual cases. Without individual billing
records, ascertainment of actual attorney fees on individual cases is difficult, and the courts
are unlikely to award attorney fees.
299. In re Marriage of Bliss, 187 Mont. 331, 335-37, 609 P.2d 1209, 1212 (1980).
300. In re Marriage of McLean, 187 Mont. 194, 199, 609 P.2d 282, 285 (1980).
301. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-219(2) (1983).
302. 175 Mont. 416, 424, 574 P.2d 989, 994 (1978).
303. Lee v. Gebhardt, 173 Mont. 305, 309-10, 567 P.2d 466, 468 (1977).
304. Id. at 309-10, 567 P.2d at 469.
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In re Marriage of Grace35 upheld an award to the wife for reasonable attorney fees incurred in forcing her ex-husband to perform
his obligations under the property settlement agreement. Because
the husband's failure to pay his federal income taxes caused a tax
lien to be placed against the jointly-owned property which the wife
received under the property settlement agreement, the supreme
court reasoned that the innocent wife should not be made to bear
the financial burden, including legal expenses, of her ex-husband's
transgressions.0
Commonly a separation agreement or dissolution decree will
include a clause which provides that attorney fees shall be awarded
to the prevailing party in any action commenced to enforce, modify, or interpret any provision of the agreement or decree. In Jensen v. Jensen30 7 the mother successfully petitioned the court for
increased child support from the husband, who earned five times
the wife's annual income. Because of the relative financial status of
the parties, and because of a clause in the separation agreement
providing for an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party, the
supreme court held that the wife had both statutory and contractual basis for recovering reasonable attorney fees.3 0 8 In so ruling,
the supreme court implied that an express contractual right for the
prevailing party to recover attorney fees is enforceable in a marital
action, regardless of the relative financial status of the parties. 0 9
The prevailing party in an appeal brought under the UMDA
may recover attorney fees incurred in the appeal.31 0 Awards of attorney fees for an appeal, however, generally should not be made
prior to the appeal, for such awards are too speculative to be reasonable.3 11 Where, however, the moving party shows financial necessity for the opposing party to pay all appellate attorney fees,
and presents evidence to prove the reasonableness of the fees, the
district court may award appellate attorney fees pending the appeal. 12 Furthermore, the district court must produce written findings to support any ruling on the appellate attorney fees. 3
Although the supreme court occasionally may award and set
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

__

Mont.

643 P.2d 1188, 1190 (1982).

Id.
Mont.
629 P.2d 765, 769 (1981).
Id.
Id.
Bier v. Sherrard,
- Mont. -, 623 P.2d 550, 554 (1981).
Bliss, 187 Mont. at 336, 609 P.2d at 1212.
Bier, __
Mont. at __, 623 P.2d at 554.
Id.
__
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reasonable appellate attorney fees in a UMDA action,3 14 the most
common means of determining reasonable appellate attorney fees
is for the supreme court to remand the case to the district court. 15
On remand the district court is able to explore the relative financial status of both parties as well as the reasonableness of the attorney fees, and make an appropriate determination under the
guidelines of section 40-4-110 of the Montana Code Annotated.
C.

ParentalResponsibility for Minor's Vandalism

Damages against a parent whose child maliciously or willfully
destroys property belonging to another are limited by section 40-6238 of the Montana Code Annotated to $2,500, plus court costs,
plus attorney fees. Attorney fees against the parent, however, may
not exceed $100.
D.

Other Family Law Matters

In any action involving child support, custody, or visitation,
the court may appoint an attorney to represent the interests of a
minor dependent child."' The court is required to assess the fees
earned by the child's court-appointed attorney against either or
both parents. 1 '
Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA), 318 a court may award attorney fees against a party which
brings a child custody action in an inappropriate forum. Section
40-7-109(3) of the Montana Code Annotated allows the court to
assess the opposing party's travel expenses and attorney fees
against a party which abducts a child from another state and
brings the child into Montana for purposes of gaining or retaining
physical custody of the child in violation of the child custody decree. " 9 Section 40-7-108(7) of the Montana Code Annotated allows
a court to assess the opposing party's travel expenses and attorney
fees against a party which brings an action in Montana to initiate
or modify a child custody decree, when another state clearly would
have been the more appropriate forum. 2 0 A person who violates a
foreign custody decree and who necessitates the enforcement of the
foreign decree in Montana may be held responsible for travel ex314.
315.
316.

317.
318.

319.
320.

Easton, 175 Mont. at 424, 574 P.2d at 994.
See, e.g., Bier, __
Mont. at -, 623 P.2d at 554-55.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-205 (1983).
Id.
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-7-101 to -125 (1983).
Commissioner's Note, MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-7-109 annot. (1984).
Commissioner's Note, MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 annot. (1984).
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penses and attorney fees of a party who is compelled by the violator's acts to enforce the child custody decree in Montana.32 1
The attorney fees provision in the UCCJA shifts the financial
burden of bringing a UCCJA action. Any person who deliberately
ignores a child custody decree, brings a child custody action in a
clearly inconvenient forum, or takes a child across state lines for
the purpose of establishing physical and/or legal custody, bears the
burden of attorney fees.
The Legislature has provided a distinct financial incentive for
employers and other debtors of a delinquent child support obligor
to assist the Department of Revenue in collecting delinquent, child
support payments. Under section 40-5-242 of the Montana Code
Annotated, a party who disobeys a court order to deliver property
of the child support obligor, or who disregards a child support lien
upon the child support obligor's property, is liable to the Department of Revenue for an amount equal to 100% of the amount
sought from the disobeying party, plus costs, interest, and attorney
fees.
XIV.

MISCELLANEOUS SITUATIONS INVOLVING THE SOVEREIGN

People expect the government to perform certain societal
functions. In attempting to fulfill these expectations, the Legislature has adopted various statutes which allow for the recovery of
attorney fees in certain actions brought by private persons for the
good of society, in actions against a government official to perform
a rightfully expected act, and in civil actions brought by the state
against private parties who have failed to fulfill certain substantial
obligations to society. Some of these statutes are discussed below.
Others, such as consumer protection laws and eminent domain
laws, are discussed at other places in this comment.
A.

Mandamus and Prohibition Writs

Section 27-26-402 of the Montana Code Annotated states that
a successful petitioner for a writ of mandamus may recover the
damages sustained, as determined by the jury, court, or referee. A
successful petitioner for the counterpart of the writ of mandamus,
the writ of prohibition,3 2 2 may also recover such damages. 2 3 For
321. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-7-116 (1983).
322. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-27-101 (1983) defines the writ of prohibition as follows:
The writ of prohibition is the counterpart of the writ of mandate. It arrests the
proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether exercising
functions judicial or ministerial, when such proceedings are without or in excess of
the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person.
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purposes of clarity, writs of prohibition and writs of mandamus
both are referred to herein as writs of mandamus.
Because a mandamus action is one in equity and not in law,
the damages recoverable under the statute are limited to those incidental to the mandamus proceeding itself, and do not include
damages "arising out of the prior preclusion or deprivation which
the writ itself was invoked in part to redress. 32 4 Attorney fees incurred in bringing the mandamus action are included as damages
incidental to the mandamus action, therefore they are recoverable
as a matter of equity.2 5 A court may award attorney fees to a successful mandamus applicant who obtains a writ against a corporate
officer,326 as well as an applicant who obtains a writ against a public official.
Prior to the adoption of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure
327
in 1962, the supreme court held in State ex rel. Phillips v. Ford
that a claim for attorney fees should be made in the original mandamus pleadings and proved in open court prior to the entry of
final judgment. The Phillips court also held that if the pleadings
did not include a prayer for attorney fees, but the issue was raised
at trial and objected to by the opposing party, the applicant should
move to amend its pleadings to include a prayer for attorney
Courts are given authority to award damages to successful applicants for writs of prohibition by MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-27-104 (1983), which makes MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-26-402
(1983) applicable to proceedings for a writ of prohibition.
323. State ex rel. Taylor v. District Court, 131 Mont. 397, 403, 310 P.2d 779, 782
(1957).
324. Bailey v. Edwards, 47 Mont. 363, 373, 133 P. 1095, 1098 (1913).
325. State ex rel. Shea v. Cocking, 66 Mont. 169, 176-77, 213 P. 594, 596 (1923).
326. State ex rel. Lawin v. Polson Plywood Co., 135 Mont. 559, 561, 342 P.2d 1070,
1071 (1959). MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-26-102(1) (1983) states that a Writ of Mandamus
may be issued by the supreme court or the district court or any judge of the district court to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person to compel the
performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station or to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled and from which he is unlawfully
precluded by such inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person.
Presumably, attorney fees may be awarded to any successful applicant and against any
party which can be made subject to a writ of mandamus. The applicant in Lawin was a
corporate shareholder who successfully sought a writ of mandamus compelling the board of
directors to declare an improperly held corporate election null and void, and to conduct a
new election. See supra section X for discussion of attorney fees in actions involving internal affairs of corporations and limited partnerships.
Because attorney fees are recoverable in mandamus actions, and because mandamus is
a broad area, a large body of case law has developed wherein attorneys have sought mandamus in a variety of situations in hopes of recovering attorney fees for their clients. See
generally, MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-26-402 annot. (1984).
327. 116 Mont. 190, 203-04, 151 P.2d 171, 177 (1944).
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fees. 328 In Johnson v. Rosenbeck,32 9 which arose before the adop-

tion of the Rules of Civil Procedure but was decided after the
adoption, the supreme court refused to allow attorney fees which
the successful applicant requested in a petition filed after the entry
of judgment. In a pre-rules case where the record contained no
proof of attorney fees incurred by the successful applicant,
the ap33 0
plicant's right to attorney fees was deemed waived.

The Montana Rules of Civil Procedure technically do not apply to mandamus actions, 331 and the Phillips and Johnson cases

presumably should control in current mandamus actions. The
Montana Supreme Court, however, invoked the Rules in Kadillak
v. Department of State Lands (hereinafter Kadillak 11)332 and
held that litigation expenses, as a natural and necessary result of a
mandamus action, are general damages, and therefore need not be
pleaded specifically. Although the supreme court did not state expressly that the Rules of Civil Procedure apply in all facets of
mandamus practice, Kadillak II appears to imply such a holding.
After Kadillak 11, the court likely would hold that the mandamus
pleadings may be amended at any time, even after judgment, to
conform with the issues raised and evidence presented at trial, as
provided by Rule 15(b), and that the judgment may be amended
within ten days of its entry, as provided by Rule 52(b). Because of
the unsettled issues in this area, an attorney for a mandamus applicant, as a matter of caution, always should include a prayer for
attorney fees in the original pleadings.
As in most other situations, reasonable attorney fees in mandamus actions are left primarily to the discretion of the district
court.3 33 The awarding of attorney fees to the successful manda-

mus applicant is permissive, not mandatory. Nevertheless, the supreme court consistently has held that a successful claimant who
proves damages including attorney fees is entitled to recover attorney fees, even though the non-moving party defended in good
faith. 4 In cases where issues other than mandamus are involved,
328. Id.
329. 141 Mont. 72, 76, 375 P.2d 221, 223 (1962).
330. State ex rel. Great Falls Housing Authority v. City of Great Falls, 110 Mont. 318,
333, 100 P.2d 915, 923 (1940).
331. See MONT. R. Civ. P. Rules 1 and 81(a); REV. CODE MONT. (1947) Vol. 7, pp. 1039,
1041 (1964 Replacement).
332. 198 Mont. 70, 643 P.2d 1178, 1183 (1982) (hereinafter Kadillak II), aff'g 184
Mont. 127, 602 P.2d 147 (1979).
333. 198 Mont. at 74, 643 P.2d at 1181.
334. See, e.g., State ex rel. Nelson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 111 Mont. 395, 399,
109 P.2d 1106, 1108 (1941); State ex rel. Griffith v. City of Shelby, 107 Mont. 571, 578, 87
P.2d 183, 187 (1939).
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reasonable attorney fees under the mandamus statute include only
those charges for the number of hours spent on the mandamus issue.3 - 5 Reasonable attorney fees to some extent are dependent
upon the value of the attorney's services to the applicant.3 3 6 If the
elements of proof are difficult, the court may rely on expert testimony in determining the value of the services expended in obtaining the writ of mandamus. 3 7 A court is not bound, however, to
follow such expert testimony once it has been received. 3 8
B.

Private Attorney General Actions

When a private party brings an action which normally would
be brought by the state, the private party may be entitled to attor3 39
ney fees if it prevails.
Section 5-7-305(5)(c) of the Montana Code Annotated provides that any private citizen who brings a successful action
against another party to enforce the state lobbying laws3 40 is entitled to recover costs and attorney fees from the other party. If the
party fails in its attempt to enforce the lobbying laws, the right to
attorney fees is reciprocal.3 4' This provision is one of the few statutory provisions for attorney fees enacted through the citizen initia3 42
tive process. ,
In any successful action by a private party to prevent, restrain,
or enjoin any activity prohibited by the Montana Cigarette Sales
Act,3 43 the court shall assess attorney fees against the defendant
and in favor of the moving party. 44 The prevailing plaintiff will
receive attorney fees even if it cannot prove any other actual damages.3 45 It is not clear whether attorney fees under the Cigarette
Sales Act are reciprocal. No cases have arisen under this act, which
335. Kadillak II, 198 Mont. at 74, 643 P.2d at 1181.
336. State ex rel. Truax v. Town of Lima, 121 Mont. 152, 157, 193 P.2d 1008, 1011
(1948).
337. Kadillak II, 198 Mont. at 75, 643 P.2d at 1181.
338. State ex rel. Lynch v. Batani, 103 Mont. 353, 364, 62 P.2d 565, 569 (1936).
339. See Comment, Attorney Fees: Slipping From the American Rule Straight
Jacket, supra note 2, at 312, for a detailed discussion of the nonstatutory concept of recovering attorney fees in private attorney general actions.
340. Montana's lobbying laws are found at MONT. CODE ANN. Title 5, ch. 7 (1983).
341. MONT. CODE ANN. § 5-7-305(5)(c) (1983).
342. The Montana lobbying laws were amended significantly by Montana Citizen Initiative No. 85, approved by a majority of Montana voters on November 4, 1980. MONT.
CONST. art. III, § 4 provides the constitutional basis for Montana's citizen initiative process.
MONT. CODE ANN. Title 13, ch. 27 (1983) provides the statutory framework for the initiative
process.
343. MONT. CODE ANN. Title 16, ch. 10 (1983).
344. MONT. CODE ANN. § 16-10-402 (1983).
345. Id.
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was adopted in 1965.
C.

Right to Know

A prevailing plaintiff in an action brought to enforce the constitutional right to know,34 6 including the Montana Open Meeting
Laws,3 47 may recover reasonable attorney fees.34 8 Although numerous right-to-know actions have arisen since the creation of the
right to know in the 1972 Montana Constitution, no cases have interpreted the statutory provision for attorney fees in right-to-know
actions. In Kadillak v. Anaconda Co. (hereinafter Kadillak /),349
the supreme court refused to decide the issue of the propriety of
an award of attorney fees in a right-to-know action, reasoning that
it previously had allowed attorney fees to Kadillak on the basis of
the mandamus action.3 50 The award of attorney fees in right-toknow actions is permissive, not mandatory. Because the right to
know usually is invoked against the state, and is intended to facilitate open deliberations of all public agencies,3 5' a party who successfully defends against an action brought under the open meeting laws probably is not afforded reciprocity of the attorney fees
provision.
D.

Bad Faith Acts of the Sovereign

In any action brought by or against the state or any of its political subdivisions, the opposing party is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees if it prevails in the action and if the court
finds that the state or its political subdivision brought or defended
the action frivolously or in bad faith.3 52 The statute apparently is
not reciprocal, although no cases have arisen under it.
346. Provided for at MONT. CONST. art. II, § 9.
347. Provided for at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2-3-201 to -221 (1983).
348. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-221 (1983).
349. 184 Mont. 127, 144, 602 P.2d 147, 157 (1979) (hereinafter Kadillak I), aff'd on
reh'g, 198 Mont. 70, 643 P.2d 1178 (1982).
350. Id. The supreme court's refusal to address the issue of attorney fees under the
right-to-know statutes may have appeared appropriate at the time, in light of the prior
award of attorney fees under the mandamus statutes. The ultimate result, however, possibly
was to deny Kadillak some attorney fees to which he may have been entitled.
In Kadillak I, the supreme court implied that Kadillak could recover all his attorney
fees under the mandamus statute, id., but the court in KadiUak H held that the mandamus
statute "provides only for an award of attorney fees for the number of hours spent by the
attorney on the mandamus issue." Kadillak H, 198 Mont. at 74, 643 P.2d at 1181. Although
Kadillak recovered $11,300 attorney fees under the mandamus statute, he ultimately received nothing for attorney fees under the right-to-know statute.
351. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-201 (1983).
352. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-10-711 (1983).
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Section 2-9-314(1) of the Montana Code Annotated requires
each attorney who files a tort claim against the state or its political
subdivision to file with the claim a copy of the attorney employment contract, specifying the fee arrangement between the attorney and his client.3 3 Failure to file a copy of the employment contract results in the attorney's forfeiture of all rights he may have
had to collect attorney fees from the state.354 Section 2-9-301 of the
Montana Code Annotated requires that all tort claims against the
state be filed with the state Department of Administration, and
that all tort claims against the state's political subdivisions be filed
with the clerk or secretary of the respective subdivision.
The Attorney General has opined that an attorney filing a tort
claim against the state should file a copy of his contract of employment with the Department of Administration.35 5 When filing a tort
claim against one of the state's political subdivisions, it is advisable to file a copy of the attorney employment contract with the
clerk or secretary of the respective political subdivision.3 56 Because
the district court in which the action is filed has jurisdiction to
regulate the amount of attorney fees,35 7 it clearly is advisable to file
the claim and a copy of the employment contract both with the
district court where the action is filed and with the Department of
Administration, if the claim is against the state, or with the secretary or clerk of the subdivision if the action is against a political
subdivision of the state. In awarding reasonable attorney fees, the
district court is to consider the time spent by the attorney for the
claimant, the complexity of the case, and any other matters which
the court finds relevant and appropriate. 35 8
E.

Administrative Law

The 1983 Legislature adopted section 2-4-406(4) of the Montana Code Annotated, which permits a court to award attorney
fees in favor of the challenging party, and against the promulgating
agency, when an administrative rule is determined by the court to
have been "adopted in arbitrary and capricious disregard for the
purposes of the authorizing statute," provided the Legislature's
Administrative Code Committee first had filed an objection to the
administrative rule in question. Although the requirement of the
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.

§ 2-9-314(1) (1983).
Id. at § 2-9-314(4).
37 Mont. Att'y Gen. Op. 121 (1978).
See MONT. CODE ADIN. § 2-9-301 (1983).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-314(2) (1983).
Id.
MONT. CODE ANN.
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Administrative Code Committee's prior objection may seem to be a
significant hinderance to recovering attorney fees, it is also of significant assistance. Once the Administrative Code Committee has
formally objected to the promulgated administrative rule, the burden of proving that the rule was promulgated in compliance with
the Montana Administrative Procedure Act rests with the promulgating agency. 59 The purpose of this statute is to "encourage aggrieved persons to litigate the validity of rules that are tainted by
formal, legislative committee objection, and . . . thus remove one
obstacle-financial expense-that discourages persons from seek:
' 36 0
ing judicial review of unlawful agency rules.
F.

Public Contracts

Section 18-1-404 of the Montana Code Annotated provides
that, in any contract action against the State of Montana, the district court is to award costs to the successful claimant in the same
manner as it would if the state were a private party. Unless the
claimant proves that it is entitled to attorney fees under section
25-10-711 of the Montana Code Annotated"' because of the state's
frivolous or bad faith conduct, "costs shall not include attorney's
3 62
fees."
In Leaseamerica Corporation of Wisconsin v. State,6 3 the
Montana Attorney General's office claimed that it was exempted
by section 18-1-404 of the Montana Code Annotated from paying
attorney fees to a successful claimant, notwithstanding a contract
provision requiring the state to pay the plaintiff's "legal expenses"
in the event of the state's default on a certain lease. The supreme
court held that the code section excluding attorney fees from costs
does not provide the state with absolute immunity from paying a
successful claimant's attorney fees if the state acted in good faith.
The court reasoned that "legal 'expenses' are not synonymous with
'costs' but rather, when provided contractually, are treated as a
'
special damage recoverable in addition to the principal sum. "364
Leaseamerica clearly established that the state is subject to the
general rule that the prevailing party in a contract action may recover attorney fees if the underlying contract makes such a
359.
360.
361.
from the
362.
363.
364.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-406(4) (1983).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-406 annot. (Uniform Commissioner's Comment) (1984).

See supra this section, subsection D, for discussion of recovering attorney fees
state because of the state's frivolous or bad faith conduct.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 18-1-404(2) (1983).
Mont. __, 625 P.2d 68 (1981).
Id. at -,
625 P.2d at 71.
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provision.
G.

Sureties

In any action brought to recover on a performance bond, labor
bond, or material bond which is posted as a prerequisite to entering into a contract to do work for the state or any of its subdivisions, 366 the prevailing party is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees for bringing the action, in addition to the amount due on
the contract and other costs.3 66 This rule apparently applies not
only to bonding for projects undertaken by the state and its subdivisions, but also to federal government projects undertaken within
Montana."'
Any claim against the surety must be made within ninety days
after the government entity affirmatively accepts the work.36 8 After
filing the claim with the surety, it is wise to wait at least one
month before filing suit to recover from the surety, for attorney
thirty days of the
fees will not be awarded in any suit filed 36within
9
initial filing of the claim with the surety.
H.

Tax Collection and Tax Deeds

If a county treasurer or the state auditor prevails in a suit
brought to collect delinquent property taxes, including delinquent
coal severance taxes,3 70 the party bringing the action is entitled to
attorney fees equal to 10% of the amount of taxes due.37 1 It appears that the attorney fees are to be awarded in addition to the
total amount of taxes due.
Section 15-18-306 of the Montana Code Annotated provides
that, in all actions brought by a party other than a county for the
purpose of securing a tax deed, the prevailing party is entitled to
reasonable attorney fees, regardless of whether the prevailing party
is the plaintiff or defendant, 1 2 but only if the prevailing party is
not a county. Because the statutory provision of attorney fees is
365. Such surety bonds are required by MONT. CODE ANN. § 18-2-201 (1983).
366. MONT. CODE ANN. § 18-2-207 (1983).
367. See United States ex rel. Western Steel Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 227 F. Supp.
939, 941 (D. Mont. 1964).
368. MONT. CODE ANN. § 18-2-204 (1983). Although the issue has not been litigated
and the statute is somewhat ambiguous, the term "the work" appears to mean acceptance of
the entire general contract.
369. MONT. CODE ANN. § 18-2-207 (1983).
370. Coal severance taxes are considered property taxes for purposes of collection.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-23-704 (1933).
371. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-16-502(2) (1983).
372. Niles v. Carbon County, 174 Mont. 20, 25, 568 P.2d 524, 527 (1977).
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mandatory, it is not necessary to pray for attorney fees in either
the complaint or the answer. 3
I.

Soil Conservation District Ordinances

If the supervisors of a soil conservation district successfully
bring an action for a court order requiring a landowner to comply
with a properly adopted soil conservation district land use ordinance, the supervisors may recover, in addition to damages, reasonable attorney fees to be fixed by the court."' An award of attorney fees in such actions apparently is discretionary, not
mandatory." 5
J.

Keeping Dangerous Animals

The 1981 Montana Legislature adopted statutes prohibiting
private persons from keeping normally nondomesticated animals
known to be capable of transmitting rabies, including skunks,
foxes, raccoons, and bats.37 6 If the Department of Health and Environmental Sciences or a county attorney prevails in an action to
enjoin a party from keeping such an animal, the defendant is liable
77
for the plaintiff's attorney fees.
K.

Crime Victims Compensation

The Workers' Compensation Division of the Montana Department of Labor and Industry, which oversees the operation of the
Montana Crime Victims Compensation program, 7 8 may award attorney fees to attorneys who represent persons bringing claims
under the program.3 79 If the claimant appeals the division's original compensation decision to the workers' compensation judge, the
judge may award attorney fees to the attorney representing the
373. Id.
374. MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-15-710(4) (1983). Although the soil conservation statutes
were adopted in 1939, no supreme court cases have arisen under this statute.
375. The statute providing for attorney fees is uniquely worded, stating that "[tihe
court shall have jurisdiction to enter judgment for . . . costs and expenses, . . . including a
reasonable attorney's fee to be fixed by the court." MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-15-710(4) (1983).
The phrase "shall have jurisdiction to . . . " seems to imply a grant of discretionary
authority.
376. See MONT. CODE ANN. Title 50, ch. 23, part 1 (1983).
377. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-23-106 (1983). This is a unique statute in that it affords
the state the right to attorney fees if it prevails, but denies reciprocity to the defendant.
378. The Crime Victims Compensation Act of Montana is found at MONT. CODE ANN.
Title 53, ch. 9, part 1 (1983).
379. MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-9-106(1) (1983).
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claimant before the court."' 0 Any award of attorney fees under the
Crime Victims Compensation Program must always be in addition
to any compensation awarded by the division3 8 1 or by the Workers'
Compensation Court. 38 2 The Workers' Compensation Division has
authority to regulate attorney fees in any crime victims' compensation claim. 33 Although the awarding of attorney fees is discretionary rather than mandatory, attorney fees are limited by statute to
5% of the amount paid to the claimant in the particular case. 4
L.

Contests of Elections

In any action contesting the right "of any person to any nomination or election to public office, '3 8 5 the district court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing
38 6

party.

XV.

HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIONS

To encourage persons who suffer from illegal discrimination to
exercise their rights under Montana's anti-discrimination laws, the
Legislature has adopted numerous statutes allowing for recovery of
attorney fees by the prevailing party in discrimination cases. If a
person is injured due to illegal discrimination on the basis of his
race, creed, religion, sex, marital status, color, age, or national origin in any situation involving employment,38 7 education,38 8 hous3890
accommodations, 9 0 financing and credit transacing,a89 public
3
9
1
government benefits distribution,3 92 or insurance and
tions,
retirement plans, 9 3 or if an employer unlawfully terminates a woman's employment because of her pregnancy or unlawfully
380. Id. at § 53-9-106(3).
381. Id. at § 53-9-106(1).
382. Id. at § 53-9-106(3).
383. Id. at § 53-9-106(2).
384. Id. at § 53-9-106(4).
385. MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-36-101 (1983).
386. MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-36-205 (1983).
387. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-303 (1983). Employment discrimination by state and
local governments is prohibited by Title 49, ch. 3 (1983). The procedure and remedies are
essentially the same as those for actions involving discrimination by nongovernmental
entities.
388. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-307 (1983).
389. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-305 (1983).
390. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-304 (1983).
391. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-306 (1983).
392. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-308 (1983).
393. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-309 (1983). This section is not effective until October 1,
1985. At the time of this writing, the Montana Legislature was considering various legislation to modify § 49-2-309.
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manipulates her maternity leave,39 4 then the person injured by
such discrimination may file a complaint with the Montana
Human Rights Commission. The complaint must be filed within
180 days of the alleged discrimination.3 9
If the informal efforts of the commission staff fail to settle the
claim, the commission shall hold a hearing, and the party prevailing at the hearing is entitled, in addition to the relief provided at
section 49-2-506 of the Montana Code Annotated, to bring an action in district court for reasonable attorney fees. 96 If no hearing
can be held within twelve months of the filing of the original discrimination complaint, and if 180 days have elapsed since the filing, the commission staff, at the request of either party, shall certify the complaint for action in district court.3 97 The district court
then may award attorney fees to the prevailing party. 398 The award
of attorney fees is discretionary, not mandatory.
XVI.
A.

APPEALS AND REMOVALS

Appeals to the Montana Supreme Court

Rule 32 of the Montana Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure
provides that the supreme court may assess damages against a
party who appeals a district court decision "without substantial or
reasonable grounds, but apparently for purposes of delay only." 99
The supreme court will find that an appeal is frivolous only if, after viewing the record as a whole, it only can come to the conclusion that the appeal was brought solely for dilatory purposes, was
unfounded,4 0 0 and was without substantial or reasonable basis. 0 1
Where there are reasonable grounds for appeal, the supreme court
4 02
will refuse to award attorney fees incurred in bringing the appeal
unless the parties, in an underlying writing, agreed that the prevailing party would be entitled to recover attorney fees.0 3
394.

MONT. CODE ANN.

§ 49-2-310 (1983).

395. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-501 (1983).
396. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-505 (1983).
397. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-509(1) (1983).
398. Id. at § 49-2-509(3).
399. MONT. R. Civ. App. P. 32 (1983).
400. Carbon County v. Schwend, 182 Mont. 89, 99, 594 P.2d 1121, 1127 (1979).
401. Sutton v. Empire Say. & Loan Ass'n, 147 Mont. 124, 128, 410 P.2d 456, 458
(1966).
402. Bailey v. Ravalli County,
- Mont. , 653 P.2d 139, 144 (1982).
403. See Diehl & Assoc. v. Houtchens, 180 Mont. 48, 53, 588 P.2d 1014, 1017 (1979), in
which the parties agreed in a real estate broker's employment contract that the prevailing
party would be entitled to attorney fees at "both trial and appellate" levels; and In re Mar-
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The supreme court has sent mixed signals regarding awards of
appellate attorney fees in cases where a statute allows the prevailing party in district court to recover attorney fees. In Allen v. Allen, 4 a marital dissolution action, the supreme court held that attorney fees are not an allowable appellate cost under Rule 33 of
the Montana Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, therefore each
party to the appeal should pay its own attorney fees.4 0 The Allen
court did not mention section 40-4-110 of the Montana Code Annotated, which permits the district court to award reasonable attorney fees to either party in a marital dissolution action.
Five weeks after the Allen decision, the supreme court in
Erdman v. C & C Sales, Inc.40 6 held that the plaintiff, who was
awarded attorney fees by the district court under section 39-3-214
of the Montana Code Annotated after he prevailed in a wage-claim
action, also was entitled to recover his reasonable additional attorney fees incurred as a result of the defendant's post-judgment motions and appeal. 0 7 The supreme court allowed Erdman to recover
his reasonable appellate attorney fees, even though the defendant's
appeal was not frivolous.40 8 The supreme court recently stated in
Simkins-Hallin Lumber Co. v. Simonson4 0 9 that it was "reluctant
to grant additional attorney fees in a case where the amount in
controversy totalled only $888, and where the trial judge, having
considered the evidence," had already awarded $800 attorney fees
to the prevailing lumber company." 1° The court reasoned, however,
that the section 41 1 under which the lumber company sought attorney fees was mandatory and therefore remanded the case to the
district court for the sole purpose of determining the lumber company's reasonable attorney fees.
Erdman and Simkins-Hallin Lumber Co. appear to establish
that, in situations involving an award of attorney fees mandated by
statute, the party prevailing on appeal is entitled to appellate atriage of Bolstad, Mont. -,
660 P.2d 95, 97 (1983), in which the parties provided that
the prevailing party would be entitled to recover attorney fees in any action arising out of
the separation agreement.
404. 175 Mont. 527, 575 P.2d 74 (1978).
405. Id. at 531-32, 575 P.2d at 77.
406. 176 Mont. 177, 577 P.2d 55 (1978).
407. Id. at 184, 577 P.2d at 59.
408. Id.
409. Mont. , 692 P.2d 424 (1984).
410. Id. at , 692 P.2d at 427.
411. The section under which the lumber company successfully sought attorney fees
was MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-3-124 (1983), regarding attorney fees in mechanics' lien foreclosures. See supra section IV, subsection B, for further discussion of attorney fees in mechanics' lien foreclosures.
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torney fees, as well as attorney fees at the district court level. Allen, on the other hand, implies that where a statute gives discretionary authority to the district court to award attorney fees, the
supreme court is unlikely to award appellate attorney fees unless
the appeal is frivolous.
B.

Appeals from Justice Court

Justice court judgments generally may be appealed to district
court. 12 Section 25-33-304 of the Montana Code Annotated authorizes the district court to attach to the bill of costs damages not
exceeding 25% of the justice court judgment, provided the district
court finds that the appellant appealed solely for dilatory purposes. One can reasonably infer that such a penalty is intended in
part to compensate the prevailing party for extra attorney fees incurred in defending against a frivolous appeal from justice court.
C.

Appeals and Removals from Small Claims Court

Whenever a party appeals a judgment from either a district
court small claims proceeding" 13 or a justice court small claims proceeding,"1 ' the appellate court may award reasonable attorney fees
to the party prevailing on appeal, provided that party is represented by counsel. Such an award of attorney fees is discretionary,
not mandatory.
If an action originally is filed in justice court small claims division, where the parties may not be represented by an attorney,""
and the defendant removes the action to justice court, ' 6 where
counsel is allowed, and the defendant does not prevail in justice
court, the court may award reasonable attorney fees to the plaintiff
if represented by counsel. "1 7 The authority to award attorney fees
in such situations is discretionary, not mandatory.
XVII.

CONCLUSION

A common thread of social and legal economic policy runs
throughout the Montana statutes which allow a prevailing party to
recover attorney fees. Persons with valid claims should not be pre412. See generally MONT. CODE ANN. Title 25, ch. 33 (1983).
413. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-34-403 (1983). The procedure for small claims actions in
district court is provided for at MONT. CODE ANN. Title 25, ch. 34 (1983).
414. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-35-806 (1983). The procedure for small claims actions in
justice court is provided for at MONT. CODE ANN. Title 25, ch. 35 (1983).
415. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-35-505(2) (1983).
416. Such removal is permitted under MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-35-605(1) (1983).
417. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-35-806(2) (1983).
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cluded from exercising their rights merely because the cost of hiring competent legal counsel exceeds the potential economic recovery under the claim.
Unfortunately, this policy does not extend to all similarly situated parties. For example, a party bringing any action sounding in
a common law tort is unlikely to recover attorney fees. Perhaps
Montana should follow the state of Washington, which has provided for the prevailing party to recover attorney fees in all damage actions where the amount pleaded is $7,500 or less. 18 Under
such a law, a party with a legitimate claim is not discouraged by
prohibitive attorney fees from bringing an action; yet a party
which otherwise might bring frivolous actions is discouraged from
doing so by the specter of paying his prevailing opponent's attorney fees.

418. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.84.250 (1985). After July 1, 1985, the prevailing party
will be entitled to attorney fees in any action where the amount pleaded is $10,000 or less.
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